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Introduction
This thesis will investigate the fortifications on the Greek island of Kalymnos in the
eastern Aegean (fig. 1) using Geographic Information Systems (GIS). While the thesis will
consider remains from the Hellenistic to the Early Modern period, the focus of the study will be
the Roman fortifications constructed in the 7th century, with secondary interest in the single
fortification built in the 11th century. Photography and in-person recording was originally
planned as a major aid to the use of GIS, but due to COVID travel restrictions this study relies
much more heavily on GIS and satellite photography to make determinations about landscape.
The aim of this thesis is to determine the details of the fortification scheme of medieval
Roman Kalymnos, including what threats informed it, what priorities it had, and how it might
have worked in practice. With a focus on the fortifications of Agios Konstantinos, Galatiani,
Kastelli, and secondarily Chora Kastro, GIS modelling will be used to determine medieval
Roman-era fields of fire, approaches from landing sites, siting priorities, and other factors
influencing these defensive structures and their use through time. This approach stresses the role
of fortifications as force multipliers rather than mere refuges, and their fields of fire, sturdiness,
and other considerations will be key in determining what forces were arrayed against them, and
what forces were defending them as well. Surface collections, architecture, landscape, and
contemporary works will also prove invaluable in this examination. In addition to fortifications,
this study will make note of population centers, demographic trends, and land use across the
island to inform analyses on the placement of defensive works. This study will have implications
on the extension and maintenance of imperial hegemony through the self-preservation impulses
of its subjects, the responses of insular communities under threat, the ways in which
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communities can survive cyclical violence, and the tactical details of an unarmed populace’s
response to armed incursions.
The level of Imperial involvement will speak to the resources available to Kalymnians
during this time, and with this in mind, analysis of the cost of construction, travel to and from,
and supplying material to these fortifications will indicate both the severity of the threat to
Kalymnos specifically, and provide insight into the daily concerns and priorities of common
islanders living in unsafe waters.
Following the introduction, I present a review of the literature and historical background
relevant to the present study, followed by chapters on theory, methods, results, a discussion and
analysis of results and research questions, and finally a conclusion in which I summarize the
findings and make firm determinations where possible.




The present study addresses the following questions:
1. What was the fortification scheme of Kalymnos during the late Roman period, from the
seventh century to the end of Roman rule in the early 14th century?
2. What were the circumstances surrounding and prompting the construction of the island’s
Roman kastra?
3. What was involved in the process of fortifying the island, in terms of funding, labor,
material sourcing, siting, etc?
4. What were the tactical and strategic characteristics of the kastra?
5. How did the Kalymnian kastra reflect the island’s position in the Roman Empire?
6. What does GIS contribute to the understanding of these central issues?
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Chapter 1: Background
Few nations in history have experienced a reversal of fortunes as sharp as that suffered by
the seventh-century Roman Empire.1 Much has been written about the consequences of this
collapse, but little focus has been given to what would become one of the key frontiers of the
ensuing war[s]: the Aegean Islands. The marks of conflict are evident in the histories as well as
upon the landscape itself, as wars and raids transformed island societies. The island of Kalymnos
is no exception, and its potential to inform an understanding of the cost of Roman-Arab warfare
in the periphery has barely been tapped. The following chapter will examine the Roman
fortifications of Kalymnos, evaluating hypotheses about the process of their construction, their
purpose, and how they link into fortification schemes on larger scales, at the island and regional
levels. In addition, this chapter seeks to elucidate the dynamics of fortifications as components of
the island, and of the fortified island as a component of the Empire.
Through examination of textual sources, several key factors of the historical context
around Kalymnos may be determined. Specifically, this chapter serves to determine the
chronology of the island’s four Roman fortifications, the nature of the threats they were built to
face, and how and why they were built. In order to address these questions, this chapter will first
describe the sites in question and consider the state of primary sources. I later examine the
motivations and necessities behind the construction of the fortifications (kastra) through a look at
contemporary threats, and argue for interpretations of the Kalymnian kastra as fortified
permanent settlements rather than refuges. Informed by this foundation, as well as an evaluation
of the nature of defensive systems in peripheral regions of the Roman Empire, before and during
the adoption of the theme system. The kastra of Kalymnos were constructed contemporaneously
with the development of the theme system, and, after several decades, eventually became part of
1 Due to the Empire’s uninterrupted possession of Kalymnos, ‘Roman’ is the appropriate term.
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it in some capacity. This naturally creates questions as to the level of authority involved in their
construction, and what degree of local autonomy was exercised in the process of fortifying the
island, both questions which this chapter examines in detail.
Nisos Kalymnos
Fig 2. The island of Kalymnos, with major habitation zones noted. The southern valley is purple, the Vathy
Valley/northern valley is light green, the western coast is brown, and Telendos’ hospitable region (which does not
include Agios Konstantinos) is in dark green. Map of Kalymnos, Greece from: "Kalymnos, Greece" Map, Google
Maps.
The Greek island of Kalymnos (fig. 2), a member of the Dodecanese archipelago, is
home to a dense and diverse array of historical and prehistoric remains, stretching from the
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Neolithic to the recent past, despite its far more rugged landscape compared to neighboring
islands.
Kalymnos itself is composed of three roughly parallel mountain ranges rising from the
sea, oriented approximately west-northwest to east-southeast. The middle one of these three
ranges is the tallest and creates valleys to its north and south, while the northernmost range
creates a long, steep peninsula which projects to the northwest, toward nearby Leros. The
northern peninsula and the western coast of the island form a bay, in which sits the mountainous
islet of Telendos. The island’s rugged terrain divides it into three distinct zones of habitation: the
southern valley, which is currently home to the vast majority of the population; the northern
valley of Vathy, which is sparsely populated, but has seen extensive farming in its rich soil for
millennia; and finally the western coast, including nearby Telendos, which contains a band of
small communities along its length, situated on the narrow stretch of coastal hills that in turn
back onto sheer mountain cliffs. The northern valley is the most isolated, having no easy points
of access to either of the other areas, but is slightly easier to reach from the southern valley. The
western coastal communities and the southern valley are connected, but, at the furthest extent of
habitation on the northwestern peninsula, the trip by land is quite long compared to the
straight-line distance between the two areas.
In addition to the circuity of its avenues of travel, Kalymnos’ extreme verticality results
in a landscape that even modern vehicles have difficulty crossing efficiently. Most maps of
Kalymnos fail to capture its hilliness properly. Only Telendos possesses an actual coastal plain,
though that, too, is small. The Vathy Valley contains most of the flat land on the island. Before
the seventh century A.D., much of the population naturally centered around flat areas, dwelling
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in the walled towns of Embolas in the Vathy Valley, Damos in the southern valley, and Pothaia
on the land bridge between Telendos and Kalymnos (Bean and Cook 131-132).
It was during the end of antiquity and the beginning of the Medieval Roman period that
Kalymnos’ identity for nearly the next thousand years would emerge. After the gradual
abandonment of its Hellenistic towns, the most important population center of Kalymnos during
late Roman antiquity was the port of Pothaia, praised in older sources for the quality and security
of its harbor (Volanakis 62-63). The site of this settlement is much contested, but local tradition
and epigraphy indicate that it was located in one of several places: the western coast of the
southern valley in the area of modern Mirties or Masouri; the eastern coastal plain of Telendos,
where ruins can be seen today; or (most likely, considering the submerged ruins) it occupied the
land bridge that once connected Kalymnos to Telendos (Bean and Cook 132). The
aforementioned land bridge was submerged by an earthquake in AD 554, and Pothaia with it,
after which the two landmasses were separated, and the population outside of the Vathy Valley
becomes difficult to locate for roughly one century (Koutellas, "Ta Kastra," 427; Volanakis
62-63). Though a pair of divers featured in the television travel series “My Greek Odyssey”
claim to have not seen any evidence of Pothaia in the strait, and the show features a dive during
which no ruins are encountered, this is very much the minority opinion on an island famed for a
history of deep sea diving, and moreover, the underwater footage reveals a remarkably craggy
and rubble strewn seafloor filled with fault-block boulders, which are clear evidence of massive
seismic activity, and would mean that the former ground surface was utterly churned, breaking
up any structures (“Telendos” 8:50-9:50). The earthquake also destroyed many other
communities on the island (Koutellas, "History" 30). During this time, and for many centuries to
come, the most significant town on Kalymnos would be the port of Rina in the Vathy Valley,
8
with its deep water harbor and virtual invisibility to passersby owing to the dogleg shape of the
inlet providing access to the port. The only shortcoming of Rina’s harbor is its narrowness, but
given the size of the settlement, this may not have been a major impediment (Koutellas, "Ta
Kastra," 429).
Yet the most significant population shift was not in the northern valley, but rather the
abandonment of the south, and the concentration of the populations of the western coast and
Telendos into a series of three highly defensible fortified settlements during the seventh century
(Koutellas, "Ta Kastra," 429). Below, the term kastro (pl. kastra) will be used to refer to these
settlements, as the term captures a particularly Roman style of fortification, and cannot be
regarded either as an aristocratic residence, a simple refuge, or a walled city (Shimoda 8).
Instead, the kastro is a fortified permanent community, with the defensibility of a castle, but
serving as a full community, albeit more isolated than typical settlements (Shimoda 8). The issue
of whether the Kalymnian kastra were permanent settlements or refuges is examined in further
detail below.
The Kastra of Kalymnos
Three of the four Roman fortifications of Kalymnos (fig. 3) were built during the seventh
century. These are the sites of Agios Konstantinos on Telendos, Galatiani near the hamlet of
Arginonta, and Kastelli on the western coast of the mainland. The remaining Roman
fortification, Chora Kastro, is, in its present state, almost entirely a product of the Knights of St.
John, with the original Roman structure having been badly damaged in an earthquake (Koutellas,
"Ta Kastra," 440). The most intensive investigation of these sites has been in the form of surface
collections, and little else has been done. Ceramic evidence indicates these sites were abandoned
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at the end of the 10th century, and the population resettled itself in less defensible locations-
from Agios Konstantinos to the eastern shore of Telendos facing Kalymnos, and to the area of
Chora on Kalymnos proper (Koutellas, "Ta Kastra," 437). Detailed descriptions of the kastra
are provided below to orient the reader.
Fig. 3. The kastra and settlements of Roman Kalymnos, from the beginning of the Roman period to the end of the
eleventh century. Circles represent cities, triangles represent kastra. Map of Kalymnos, Greece from: "Kalymnos,
Greece" Map, Google Earth.
Kastelli
Kastelli (fig. 4), the smallest of the three seventh-century kastra of Kalymnos, is located on
the western coast, and consists of a fortified promontory of rock surrounded by a second layer of
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walls at lower elevation, and long, crenellated walls reaching down to the sea, running north and
south of the main fortification. The siting of Kastelli is uniquely impressive, being located on a
steep conical hill at the end of a narrow, rocky peninsula with no beaches, thus granting its
former defenders a significant elevation advantage over all approaches. From Kastelli, one can
see clearly to Agios Konstantinos on Telendos, down much of the western coast to the south, and
almost the entire northern half of the western coast as well, with easy sightlines both to Galatiani
and Emporio. While this promontory once would have held even greater value, as the end of the
land bridge between Kalymnos and Telendos, and thus the harbor of Pothaia, would have once
been directly south of the kastro. However, after the sinking of Pothaia, the site no longer
protected the approach to a significant anchorage (Koutellas, “History,” 30). Regardless, the
seventh century fortification had many valuable qualities in addition to its defensibility. It was
more accessible than the other two by far, owing to its low elevation and central location, and
also the potential to control movement along the entire western coast of Kalymnos from its
strategic location (Kardulias 16). Indeed, not only was Kastelli situated perfectly for defenders to
intercept any land traffic along the western coastal corridor, it would even have allowed
defenders to directly fire on the entire stretch of coast from the peninsula to the mountain cliffs,
if the kastro possessed long-ranged artillery. The deployment of artillery will be addressed in the
methods chapter, under the appropriate heading.
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Fig. 4. The kastro of Kastelli. From the akropolis, the southern sea wall is visible travelling northwest-southeast.
Map of Kastro Kastelliou, Kalymnos from: "Kalymnos, Greece" Map, Google Maps.
Agios Konstantinos
Agios Konstantinos (fig. 5) is the only fortification extant on Telendos, the
mountain-island opposite the western shore of Kalymnos. Though Telendos has a relatively
accessible eastern shore with flat, arable land, and easy access to the sea, Agios Konstantinos is
located hundreds of meters up on the shoulder of the mountain’s north side, with the sheer cliff to
the mountaintop at its south, a steep cliff to its east, sharp drop-offs and a narrow access path to
the west, and, the only side with practical access, a series of precipitous gullies to the north.
Owing to its strategic use of terrain, Agios Konstantinos is entirely secure with only two
stretches of wall, one of which prevents access from the northern gullies, and contains the main
gate, the other of which is an impressive gate and bastion blocking the already inaccessible
western approach to the settlement. Agios Konstantinos is the largest of the three
seventh-century kastra, both in enclosed area as well as in quantity of structures, with a great
number of cisterns and foundations visible, many of which are partially submerged in a
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scree-like scatter, composed of some combination of eroded mountain stones and old building
material.
Agios Konstantinos is, from a certain perspective, the most inaccessible of the three
kastra; certainly more so than Kastelli, and considering Galatiani’s dispersed nature despite its
smaller internal area, the sheer density of Agios Konstantinos’ population is notable. The visible
foundations are concentrated mostly around the still-extant church of Agios Konstantinos and the
main gate, leaving the entire western half of the enclosed area very sparsely occupied. In spite of
its difficult access, there are many dozens of foundations in the central area of the kastro. Even
modern propeller boats have difficulty landing tourists directly below the kastro’s gully
approach, as its ‘beach’ is in fact composed of sheer meter-high rough stones, and the only
practical approach for large groups would have to be from the coastal plain on Telendos’ east
coast, following the narrow path between the mountain and the sea.
Fig. 5. The kastro of Agios Konstantinos. Main habitation area is the bottom two-thirds of the right half of the
image, with the wall visible to its north, and a cliff and mountainside protecting its east and south, respectively. The
wall stops where the northern slope turns fully sheer, but the small western wall is visible at the left of the image,




Galatiani (fig. 6) stands atop one of the highest peaks of its range, almost directly north of
the terraced bay hamlet of Arginonda. The kastro itself is arguably even more minimalist than
Agios Konstantinos, composed of one long wall surmounting the southern ridgeline, wrapping
around the steep mountain slope to the west, and ending in a small stretch which blocks off the
rough northern approach along the shoulder of the mountain. Inside the walls, there are far fewer
structures than at Agios Konstantinos, and the kastro at Galatiani is the least architecturally
preserved of the three, by a significant margin; I had long labored under the assumption that
Galatiani was composed merely of a north and south wall, due to the remarkably poor condition
of the western section, and the writings of archaeologist and local Ephoria office director
Michael Koutellas, which describe the wall as protecting the two possible approaches (Koutellas,
“Ta Kastra,” 65). The western part of the wall is of questionable defensive necessity given its
position atop a nearly-sheer cliff, and is currently indistinguishable from aerial photographs, and
even to some visitors, who describe the kastro as having multiple walls rather than a continuous
circuit (Heslop 39). At present, Galatiani is also the hardest to reach and likely least visited as a
result, with a steep mountain climb aided by few paths, the main one of which is prone to erosion
(Heslop 39).
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Fig. 6. The kastro of Galatiani. The north-south ridge in the north portion of the image adjoins the beginning of the
wall’s northern portion, which follows the slope around the west side, tops the ridge on the south side of the plateau,
and terminates at the eastern cliffside, just south and east of the church of Panagia Galatiani (bottom right, blue
roof). Map of Church of Panagia Galatiani, Kalymnos from: "Kalymnos, Greece" Map, Google Maps.
Primary Sources
The most important primary sources on the fortifications of Kalymnos are a mix of
photographs both from ground and air, written descriptions of their physical characteristics, and
personal statements from people who have visited them, in addition to my own experience
having visited Kastelli and many other sites on the island. Though not primary sources in the
traditional sense, the travel restrictions imposed by COVID-19 have required study of these
locations from afar, and, without any ancient statements concerning them directly, the best
primary sources are those describing the state of the ruins today, either visually or in text
(Shimoda 16).
The primary textual sources for this period are, unfortunately, generally vague and
oblique in their references to relevant military matters, barring the turning point that is the Battle
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of the Masts (A.D. 655). The military situation of the Aegean islands, being of secondary
importance to the terrestrial portions of the themes in which they were located, is not given much
attention, and brief references to attacks are mostly all that appear, save for the obvious
exceptions of Crete and Cyprus, owing to their size and importance. Arab raids were prevalent at
sea and on land, but land incursions receive the lion’s share of attention. Thus it is that Kalymnos
has extensive fortifications, and yet is absent from the surviving histories, making it unclear to
what extent the island was attacked.
The Chronographia of Theophanes is perhaps the most famous history of the period, but
its focus is generally far from naval matters, and is, understandably, focused on the actions of
Emperors, who were unlikely to have taken personal interest in the Dodecanese. As such, it has
little direct relevance to the construction of the kastra. Such a perspective is near-universal in
chroniclers of the time. Emblematic of contemporary historians’ disinterest in the islands is
Theophanes’ treatment of the earthquake of 554, which he describes as terrible, but only in
reference to the destruction in Constantinople, while on Kalymnos, that same earthquake sank
one of the island’s two cities, and received no mention (Theophanes 335; Volanakis 62-63). If
such a dramatic event was passed over by one of the more detail-oriented Roman histories, it is
hardly surprising that al-Tabari, Michael the Syrian, and other foreign sources likewise have
nothing to say about Kalymnos.
Motivation to Fortify: The Arab Raids
After the Battle of the Yarmouk (A.D. 636), Roman resistance to the Arabs collapsed in
much of the Empire. However, once the borders were locked at the Taurus mountains, in 649 a
seaborne expedition of Arab troops attacked and despoiled Cyprus, an event which would be
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repeated many times; in 650, the result was the fall of Konstantia/Salamis, leading either to
widespread destruction or the levelling of fortifications specifically (Michael the Syrian 131;
Theophanes 478-479). In a few short years following the attacks on Cyprus, Mu’awiya looted the
island of Kos, Kalymnos’ longtime administrative superior throughout the Hellenistic and
Classical Roman period, tearing down its fortifications, and performed similar deeds on the
islands of Rhodes and Crete, as well as on Arados after an initial failure (Koutellas, "Ta Kastra,"
428; Michael the Syrian 131; Theophanes 481-482). The famous Battle of Phoinix, or Battle of
the Masts to Arabs, was fought soon after these events- The Chronographia of Theophanes
places the event in 653, the same year as the first fall of Rhodes (Theophanes, 482). The
attention that Arab writers paid to fortifications emphasizes their importance in securing islands.
The result of losing naval supremacy to the Arabs was that the annual Arab raids into
Anatolia were mirrored by incessant piracy and amphibious raids in the Aegean and eastern
Mediterranean (Koutellas, “Ta Kastra,” 428). While this phenomenon is given little notice in
grand-scale histories, it was so locally devastating that islanders from the Dodecanese to Cyprus
refer to the period roughly from the mid-seventh to tenth centuries as the Arab Raids.
The nature of Arab raids varied, and they had diverse goals. Some intended to settle the
land they attacked, as seen in the occupation of Crete and parts of Attica, in contrast with the
smash-and-grab acquisitions of loot and slaves seen in the siege of Thessaloniki; they were
neither purely in pursuit of plunder, nor purely concerned with conquest (Setton 311-312;
Kaminiates).
There are no explicitly attested attacks on Kalymnos by Arab raiders in the histories. As
such, archaeology is the only possible source of hard dates or evidence. Unfortunately, the first
and only potential form of archaeological evidence of warfare on the island itself is represented
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by Newton’s discovery of a scatter of bronze arrowheads near the basilica of Christos tou
Ierousalim, which he interpreted as evidence of arrows being fired, based on their dispersal
pattern and their points being blunted as if by impact (Newton 307). Unfortunately, it seems
likely that this event, if combat it was, did not involve Arab raiders, as Arabs switched from
using bronze in arrowheads to using iron during the Hellenistic period (Hoyland 188). However,
there are many surviving examples of Roman arrowheads from the mid-first millennium A.D. of
cast bronze; Arab arrowheads of such a type are more elusive (Sermarini Jr.). With Newton’s
very sparse description, simply stating that the arrowheads are bronze, the furthest assumption
that can be made is that they were part of a Roman defense in the area of Damos; in all
likelihood, this does not represent warfare of the period and type which would aid in the present
study.
Lacking direct evidence of attacks on Kalymnos, comparanda do exist from attacks on
the other Dodecanese, as well as other islands generally. The broader context of attacks on
Aegean islands must serve as a next-best substitute; besides the obvious case of Crete, there are a
handful of smaller, scattered references that will serve as guides to ascertain the degree of threat
Kalymnians faced.
Seventh-century Rhodes was attacked both by the Persians and on multiple occasions by
the Arabs, with varying degrees of success (Ballance 7). In many of these cases, fortifications are
prominent in historical records. For instance, the first fall of Rhodes to the Arabs was
accompanied by destruction of its fortifications (Michael the Syrian 142). When Arabs again
captured the island in 673, al-Tabari states that they decided to use the main fort on the island as
a refuge, set up a naval watchpost, and that the Roman response was primarily to blockade the
island’s ports, showing a reluctance to confront even depleted fortifications in their own territory
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(al-Tabari 166). Additionally, an Arab raid in 807 failed to conquer Rhodes because the
defenders of a fortification outlasted them (Theophanes 663). Taken together, these examples
show how pivotal island fortifications could be, but also show the amount of strain a garrison
could place on the local population.
Unlike Rhodes, Kos seems to have been less affected by Arab raids, at least early on, as
the decline of its main port city occurred after the seventh century (Poulou 237, 239). Though
Kos was certainly more densely populated than Kalymnos, and thus a harder target, it is
noteworthy that the rapid population shift of Kalymnos was not replicated on its larger and
wealthier neighboring island. The destruction of Kos’ fortifications attested by Michael the
Syrian thus seems to have not been as decisive an event or as complete as the description would
make it seem.
Even before the devastation of the Roman fleet at the Battle of Phoinix, al-Tabari implies
that raids must have been constant. In his record of the year 649, he notes the death of the
admiral of Mu’awiya’s volunteer naval forces, ‘Abdallah bin Qays al-Jasi, who performed more
than fifty seaborne raids (al-Tabari 28). Considering that Mu’awiya was only given permission
for this venture by Caliph Uthman, since Umar had disapproved of it, these fifty raids can, at
most, have taken place over the course of five years, thus, a minimum average of ten per year
(al-Tabari 27-29). While this would seem to belong purely in the realm of hyperbole, ‘Abdallah’s
death is strange enough to imply otherwise. Specifically, the story of his death at the hands of
local Romans after giving alms to beggars and being exposed by a beggar woman who knew him
by his generosity, implies that he must have visited the same place previously (al-Tabari 28).
Naturally, this tale itself raises issues, and is probably a fanciful turn on an undignified death at
the hands of peasants. Still, the author’s assumption that the reader should find it plausible that
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‘Abdallah would have become known to the islanders, not simply as a vague menace but at the
level of identifiable character traits, implies that ‘Abdallah truly did make a great number of
incursions into Roman waters (al-Tabari 27-28). If ‘Abdallah was so prolific a raider, it is hard to
imagine he was the only one.
In addition to the vaunted exploits of raiders, the Roman state’s own administrative
system implies a truly staggering number of raiding incidents. The Marcian Treatise lays out a
specific type of land ownership category for property that has been vacated by fleeing peasants,
and the specific detail with which this topic is treated, and even said to often be caused by raids,
implies that this was something the Roman state dealt with constantly (Neville 40).
Centrality or Periphery
In examining the defensive organization of Kalymnos, and the scale on which its defense
was organized, it is imperative to establish just how much attention and support it and other
similar islands could have counted on from imperial office-holders.
The Aegean was consistently a nominal part of the Roman Empire throughout the first
millennium A.D. However, this alone did not guarantee the region attention or priority, as is
reflected in its relatively minor place in the already meagre written records of the time (I.
Randall 82). The Aegean islands have always drifted between states of connectivity and
isolation. If or when organization is noticeable on a larger scale, such involvement may indicate
the Roman “Dark Age” in the Aegean to have been a more connected period than is often
suggested (I. Randall 83). As a result, the understanding of Roman efforts to fortify the region
inevitably relies heavily on archaeology, while maintaining an awareness of the spotty record of
conclusions drawn from material culture in this period and region (I. Randall 84; Metcalf 399).
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While unlikely to have attained the relevance of neighboring Kos, Kalymnos was a trade
destination nonetheless, even during the Arab raids, when its population retreated into uplands or
natural defensive points, and fortified them. Nowhere is this more evident than in the surface
collections recovered from the mountaintop fortified settlement of Galatiani, near modern
Arginonta, which included, among other things, a ring, lead measures, and scale components and
weights used to evaluate the purity of gold coinage (Koutellas, "Ta Kastra," 432). The use of
currency generally having declined rapidly throughout the peripheral empire after the Arab
conquests, such a scale is important evidence of continuing economic activity; after all, one
would hardly need such fine tools to measure out grain or other barter goods (Whittow 90). If
even an isolated mountaintop such as Galatiani had inhabitants who were making use of gold
coinage, it stands to reason that the islanders’ defensive posture and the threat of Arab attack was
no hindrance to Kalymnian interaction with the Roman government, and likely broader trade
networks as well (Whittow 90). While coinage was always of use in paying taxes, and the
collection of it is evidence that these probably were tax-paying citizens, the scales imply a
concern with the worth of coins, rather than just their quantity. If coins are being amassed only to
pay the taxman, few would be concerned with the quality of those coins, as the only point at
which purity of coinage might change the transaction (barring forgery) is if the coins are
obviously worthless and debased. Instead, the concern with gold purity implies interest in coins
as units of exchange, not just for fulfilling government obligation, but for amassing wealth. After
all, Roman coinage, despite its central control, often was worth more than the gold it contained,
and such a system allows for variance (Neville 9). Moreover, it is a well-known economic
principle that, when people hoard money, they hoard the best money; this is half of the ‘bad
money problem.’ Such hoarding, especially with gold coins before the advent of modern
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precision machinery, would be greatly aided by a set of scales. With this in mind, the initial
image of cloistered villages hidden away from raiders and remote from imperial ties begins to
look incomplete.
Refuge Fortresses vs Fortified Settlements
Despite only having one Roman fortification that is always referred to as kastro (Chora
Kastro/Castle) the Roman fortifications of Kalymnos all fit the term. In the period in question,
kastro describes not a castle, as it is often translated, but rather a fortified settlement, not
necessarily on the scale of or supplanting an urban center, and with relatively formidable
fortifications and siting (Shimoda 8). The persistent interpretation of kastra as primarily places
of refuge runs counter to much of the evidence from Kalymnos, and has been contested in
analyses of fortified islands in the Saronic and Korinthian Gulfs (Kardulias et al.; Gregory).
The three seventh-century fortifications of Kalymnos each have a number of houses
within them; Agios Konstantinos has the most, Galatiani the second most, and Kastelli the
fewest. Considering their locations near the sea and the number of dwellings within each, it is
obvious that these were true fortified settlements, and not mere temporary refuges (Koutellas,
"Ta Kastra," 434). Moreover, surface finds collected by Koutellas ("Ta Kastra," 435), the most
diagnostic of which are various local ceramics, suggest habitation in these three settlements
lasted until around the tenth century (Koutellas, "Ta Kastra," 435). If the need for refuge was so
considerable that one island featured three of them, yet people had their permanent dwellings
elsewhere, one would expect some form of fortification to appear around that community as
well. At the very least, such fortification would serve as insurance if one cannot reach the
fortified sites, which are relatively remote from the fertile regions of the island. However, no
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extant remains suggest that any other fortifications (or towns other than Rina) of note existed
during this period. The walls of Embolas and Damos were likely in little better condition than
they are currently, save for a few blocks here and there used in churches, and the Hellenistic fort
of Kastri is small and difficult to reach. Rina was continuously inhabited owing to its fertile soil
and the protection of its narrow-mouthed dog-leg harbor, but it lacked walls, and was on the
other side of the island, separated by many kilometres and at least one mountain range from any
of the major fortifications--undesirable traits in a refuge to which one must flee (Koutellas, "Ta
Kastra," 429). As such, the contention that the three fortified locations are permanent settlements
is difficult to dispute.
However, it bears mentioning that the order in which the components of these sites were
built, i.e. dwellings and then fortifications, does not have sufficient archaeological data to be
ascertained with certainty. This paucity of hard dates brings into question the nature of these
sites, opening up the potential that they were already inhabited, and merely received
fortifications in response to the Arab threat. Nonetheless, it seems very likely that the three
locations were at least chosen with defensibility as a primary consideration, and thus that
fortification would have followed soon on the heels of settlement, if the two types of
construction were even temporally discrete events in the first place. The obviously difficult
approaches to each site, and location far from any beaches, would make them foolish choices as
simple dispersed resettlements of old Pothaia’s population. Galatiani is the clearest example of
this, having seemingly nothing to recommend the site other than its defensibility and excellent
sight-lines. Thus, it stands to reason that these were places chosen to be fortified.
Beyond the location alone, architectural evidence is highly instructive in establishing the
contemporaneity of houses and fortifications. Roman citizens and officials often preferred to
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incorporate existing buildings into any impromptu fortifications, as was done in an unsuccessful
attempt to defend Cypriot Salamis/Konstantia from the Arabs in the 650s, and had been done
long before (Lawrence 201). Indeed, even a prosperous city like seventh-century Side readily
incorporated architectural remains into new walls when possible, and thus it is unlikely that a
much smaller community would have neglected to do so if such architecture was present
(Lawrence 201). The western portion of Galatiani’s wall curves to follow the contours of the cliff
upon which it stands, placing most portions of it on steep terrain, unfavorable for construction.
However, one of the settlement’s largest houses is built sharing a side with the fortification wall
(Koutellas, "Ta Kastra," 432). Taken together with the style of fortification used elsewhere to
defend an already-existing settlement, it is clear that Galatiani’s houses were built, at the earliest,
concurrent with the defensive walls, and could well have been built later, as such a large
dwelling would be far easier to build on the flatter portion of the mountain, unless the wall
already existed, thereby making the calculation favorable due to the need to erect only three
walls. In addition, the wall would have been more expediently built if it had followed more level
ground in order to exploit more house walls and flatter terrain, which would not have hampered
its effectiveness significantly due to the nearby cliff, and decreased the effort required to build it;
this implies that the houses did not yet exist to represent a potential mitigation of costs.
Considering the wall’s relatively rough and steep path on the west, it is thus likely that the
majority of houses were completed after the wall’s construction.
The cisterns of Galatiani and Agios Konstantinos both support similar conclusions. While
Kastelli is a small conical hill, Galatiani and Agios Konstantinos are built on a mountaintop and
high on a mountain slope, respectively. With this in mind, the location of all of the cisterns of
each site within the defensive walls, which follow natural contours, would seem unlikely if the
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cisterns predated the walls. This is because cisterns are more efficient at collecting water the
further down a slope they are, and Agios Konstantinos even features several natural gullies
which would funnel winter rainfall, allowing for greater water collection downstream (Mays et
al. 1921, 1929). The fact that this advantage was not exploited by even a single cistern at lower
elevation in the case of either fortification suggests that the wall existed by the time of the
cisterns’ construction, because while the walls exploit the most beneficial topography for their
type of structure, the cisterns do not, and they clearly only appear within the walls.
Finally, though divorced from the other three kastra by a significant gulf of time, Chora
Kastro represents a very clear example of a Roman fortified settlement built as such. Unlike its
seventh-century counterparts, Chora Kastro’s construction is part of a broader Aegean trend of
new fortifications in the eleventh century, in response to intense Seljuk naval raids from Smyrna
under the chieftain Tzachas, which occurred in the last quarter of the century (Koutellas, "Ta
Kastra," 441). Chora Kastro was certainly no ramshackle refuge, since its current clifftop
walls--which likely overlie the Roman ones as no foundations are evident for them
elsewhere--encompass an area large enough for 1,200 inhabitants, and likely more under the
duress of a siege (Koutellas, "Ta Kastra," 440). While Koutellas contends that the Knights’
rebuilding after the destructive earthquake of 1493 is what gave the fortification its current shape
and size, this hypothesis requires a reconstruction effort that would have been unheard of in its
thoroughness, entirely removing even previous, usable foundations and remaining components of
the old wall, and rebuilding every single house from scratch in a new configuration (Koutellas,
"Ta Kastra," 441). Moreover, Koutellas argues the difference in the Roman fortifications by
noting their absence on a fifteenth-century map predating the reconstruction. However, the map
of Kalymnos found in Bartolomeo Dalli Sonetti’s Isolario, drawn in 1485 and thus also predating
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the reconstruction, depicts what appears to be a fortified hilltop settlement in the approximate
location of Chora Kastro (Sonetti).
In fact, the English name Chora Castle is quite inaccurate, as it is a thoroughly walled
town on top of a steep-sided promontory, rather than a simple castle, and it is a town that could
accommodate some 1,200 inhabitants, with numerous structures evident even today (Koutellas,
"Ta Kastra," 440). The construction of Chora Kastro in the eleventh century followed closely on
the heels of the abandonment of the three other fortified settlements; judging by its current
clifftop walls being the only set of walls to have any visible remains, the Roman walls must have
stood on the same spot, encompassing a similar internal area to the one currently visible
(Koutellas, "Ta Kastra," 441).
Building Program vs. Local Response
At first glance, Kalymnos and other similar islands would seem to have been well
beneath the notice of officials and wealthy benefactors, barring some sort of catastrophe. While
at first the idea of Kalymnos occupying the minds of the imperial court seems dubious, the
evidence of trade indicates that Kalymnos was no unvisited backwater either. As such, the
fortresses’ origins come into question.
The timeline for the fortresses’ construction thus becomes of key importance. The
consensus for a date of construction seems to rest on the seventh century A.D., and quite
reasonably so given the Arab incursions. However, a shift of a few decades in either direction
can provide valuable additional context. If some or all of the fortifications had been built in the
very early eighth century, they could well have served as a response to the famous Arab siege of
Constantinople of 717-718.
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Additionally, the motivations for the construction may shed further light on the issue.
Several hagiographies mention as background detail that islanders were terrified of Arab raids
during the seventh century, providing ample cause to lend their labor to fortification efforts
(Christides 1332-3).
Chain of Command in Fortification
Kalymnos’ place within the Roman state, like many other places throughout the empire,
changed throughout the evolution of the theme system. Originally in the Karabisianoi fleet,
Kalymnos changed hands with the eventual emergence of the Kibyrrhaiotai in the early eighth
century (Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium 1127).
Unlike the fortifications of the Knights of St. John on the island, Kalymnos’ Roman
fortifications have no clear designated sponsor or commissioner. As such, there are three
possibilities that must be considered as to the origin of the command to build the fortifications:
that the order for their construction came from the Emperor, from an officer below the throne
(i.e. strategos or lower), or that they were constructed due to a decision made by the Kalymnian
community, be it only the western shore and Telendos, or the entire island as a whole. Moreover,
the origins of the resources used to construct these fortifications and new settlements, including
funds, raw material, and labor, could have come from or been supplemented by any of the
aforementioned authorities.
Theophanes rarely attributes the construction of forts to any agent, but when he does so,
it is inevitably to an Emperor, and used as part of an ongoing or shakily concluded land
campaign (Theophanes 617). Theophanes gives similar attribution to reconstruction efforts,
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stating that Emperor Nikephoros rebuilt the forts destroyed during an Arab raid in Anatolia in the
early ninth century (Theophanes 664).
The most obvious physical evidence against imperial sponsorship of the Kalymnian
kastra is the rough quality of their stonework. Shimoda notes that, in the Roman Morea, fine
ashlar masonry with extensive mortar was likely the product of imperial work; conversely, the
small, rough-cut stones of the Kalymnian kastra make an imperial origin unlikely (Shimoda 59).
Naturally, this does not preclude the possibility of imperial funding simply being small or spread
around, as the three fortifications would have required a significant amount of labor. However, if
the Emperor sponsored a project, its results would impact his standing, and the cobbled walls of
the kastra in question hardly seem like demonstrations of imperial largesse (Shimoda 35).
Indeed, Samos was the target of an imperial reconstruction period in the 830s, and,
despite the gulf of two centuries, the stark differences in comparison to the Kalymnian kastra are
still notable. Samos’ Kastro Tigani was restored with precise ashlar masonry and fine brickwork,
and bore a dedicatory plaque proclaiming Theophilos’ patronage and power, thus ensuring that
all knew who was responsible, and where their loyalties should therefore lie (Lauxterman
272-273). The fact that Kastro Tigani is one of the few island kastra that was explicitly an
imperial project demonstrates that the defenses of the islands were likely of little concern to
Emperors. For Samos to have been uniquely favored, it needed a singular quality, and that was
its fleet base, i.e. its great value both in defensive and offensive operations. Judging by the state
of Kalymnian harbors in the seventh century, with that of Rina being a narrow defile, and little
significant infrastructure evident on the west coast or on the shores of Telendos, it likely lacked
sufficient military potential to justify imperial interest in its defense.
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Instead of the Emperor, it is possible that a strategos or similar high officer may be
responsible for the order to construct the Kalymnian fortresses. Such an officer would almost
certainly be of the Karabisianoi fleet, if the kastra are indeed from the seventh century, but
Kalymnos later was part of the Theme of the Kibyrrhaiotai after the early eighth century (Oxford
Dictionary of Byzantium 1127; Pryor & Jeffries 25). Thus, three major possibilities present
themselves. First, the fortifications may predate the establishment of even the Karabisianoi fleet
and are thus part of an entirely different command structure; second, the Karabasianoi may be
responsible; third, the fortifications may be slightly later, and created under the Kibyrrhaiotai.
If the fortifications predate the Karabisianoi, they would only do so by a very narrow
margin, as Pryor and Jeffries as well as Christides contend that the fleet was established after the
defeat at the Battle of the Masts (Pryor & Jeffries 25). The primary sources do not state the
specific year of the fleet’s establishment, but its first textual mention is around 680, providing a
terminus ante quem (Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium 1105).
While dates from ceramics in the Kalymnian kastra have only been narrowed down to the
seventh century, more precise numismatic dating has revealed generally earlier chronology for
the similar fortification of Emporio on Chios (complicated by continual occupation of the site
previous to its being fortified) (Ballance 7). Emporio was fortified during the reign of either
Heraklios or Konstans II (610-668), which opens the possibility of a wave of military
construction in response to the Persian attack on Rhodes in 622/23, rather than the raids of the
Arabs, however remote such a possibility is (Ballance 7).
The likeliest possibility is that the fortifications were erected under the Karabisianoi. This
possibility likewise makes the greatest sense for external funding of the construction efforts, as
the Karabisianoi fleet, and thus its head officers, was headquartered at Samos, a mere 160 km
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from Kalymnos, whereas Attaleia (headquarters of the Kibyrrhaiotai) is more than twice that
distance as the crow flies, and even further by sea (Pryor & Jeffries 25). Moreover, the defensive
logic for fortifying islands is stronger under the Karabisianoi, as Kalymnos would be on the
opposite side of Samos from Constantinople, and thus would have likely been beyond the most
intensely patrolled areas, and any attacks would be less likely to be intercepted. On the other
hand, the Kibyrrhaiotai being stationed at Attaleia meant that, by the eighth century, Arab raiders
from the Levant would have to pass by one of the largest Roman naval bases in order to reach the
Dodecanese, making the intensity of raids to which Cyprus was subjected quite understandable.
Indeed, while the Kibyrrhaiotai fleets were active in interdiction efforts, those efforts did not
extend significantly into the Aegean, and enemies that got past were unlikely to be taken until
the return journey (Leontsini 174-175). If word only reached the Samian fleet yards once the
enemy was nearly upon Kalymnos, it would have been very hard for the imperial ships to catch
them before significant damage was done. Fortifications and ships were some of the most
expensive military projects of their time, and thus construction of the Kalymnian kastra should
have avoided wasting these resources; if the fleets were moored at Samos, they would have little
hope of interdiction against craft of equivalent or greater speed, but, if the enemy were held in
place attempting to take hard targets, the fleet would prove far more valuable as a military asset.
Sailing from Samos to Kalymnos was by no means a short journey in seventh-century
ships. Pryor and Jeffries figure average galley travel speed at 2 knots (3.6 kmph), and calculate
the victorious Cretan expedition of the 10th century at speeds between 2.4 and 4.6 knots
(4.44-8.52 kmph) (Pryor & Jeffries 333). Even assuming the highest suggested speed, a fleet
would take slightly less than nineteen hours of continuous sailing to cross the straight-line
distance between Kalymnos and Samos; add to this the fact that no such voyage would actually
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be in a straight line, the delays involved in relaying news of enemy attack, drawing up response
plans, provisioning ships, gathering sailors, launching the ships, and ensuring the force is ready
to move as one, the resultant response time would grant any Arab raiders a substantial window of
opportunity to pillage to their hearts’ content.
Under the theme system, small-scale fortifications to protect valuable trade goods were
possibly created on the orders of high officers. Ballance (6-7) asserts that the short-lived Kastro
at Emporio on Chios functioned partially to secure the trade of mastic gum; if such a mercantile
approach to fortification was indeed practiced, then Kalymnos may likewise have been given
greater consideration for its even rarer export of sponges. Of course, this assumes the antiquity of
the Kalymnian sponge trade, which, owing to the great perishability of the tools and products of
this trade, is all but unverifiable archaeologically. Moreover, as mundane goods, sponges are not
a primary concern of historical records. Another possibility, lent credence by the remote
locations of two of the kastra, is that their sites were chosen partially for access to lumber. As the
Roman economy was restructured during the seventh century, a high priority was placed on
supplies for building and maintaining fleets (Leontsini 178). Though Kalymnos is now fully
denuded of virtually all natural tree growth, this may not always have been the case, as
evidenced by Sonetti’s Isolario depicting Kalymnos partially forested (Sonetti). The remote
mountainsides and least populated stretch of the already sparsely populated western coastal lane
would have been far more attractive if their remoteness meant they had access to sources of
wood, which are otherwise few on the island. Though the benefits of forestry would not be
exclusively recognized by thematic commanders, the existing precedent is thematic in origin.
Thematic dates are put forward by Heslop, as well as Bean and Cook, albeit both argue
only for Kastelli being later than the others; the arguments hinge respectively on a subjective
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assessment of the quality of the construction, and a very vague orally transmitted tale (Heslop
41). Heslop’s argument that Kastelli’s walls are far finer than the others omits that Kastelli is
nonetheless still far from an architectural marvel, and is only distinctive in that the walls of the
other two kastra are even rougher. More importantly, the argument that higher quality stonework
is an indication of a later date conveniently ignores the fact that the much earlier Hellenistic
fortifications of Kastri, Embolas, Damos, and Kastellas all have much finer ashlar masonry than
any of the seventh-century kastra. Moreover, Kastelli’s fortification would have good reason to
be the strongest even if built contemporaneously, as its outer walls are the easiest to approach of
the three fortifications, and its position near sea level and without a significant rise to protect its
entrance would logically encourage its builders to make up the gap by other means. As for the
anecdote, Bean and Cook claim a ninth-century foundation for Kastelli by refugees from Rina,
on the basis that “it is said” to be so (Bean and Cook 132). Even were this more thoroughly cited,
it is worth noting that another popular tale about Kastelli involves the castle’s princess and her
forbidden love for a young man in Pothaia causing the earthquake that collapsed the land bridge,
destroyed the city, and made Telendos an island. Thus, the folklore about Kastelli places its
construction within a broad window of about three centuries, and its inhabitants were either
royalty of some yet-to-be-rediscovered kingdom, or refugees cobbling together masonry far more
efficiently than people with homes and food in their bellies. In short, both Heslop and Bean and
Cook’s claims of later dates are extremely shaky, and, in general, a thematic origin for Kastelli
has little in the way of solid proof.
In fact, the only dramatically superior stonework within the seventh-century kastra is
found in the western wall of Agios Konstantinos, which possesses thick walls and large ashlar
masonry, much more fitting for an imperial construction effort (Newton 318). However, Newton
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reports secondhand that locals refer to that portion as Hellenistic; considering it is just one wall,
and protecting the far more inaccessible route to the kastro at that, it seems unlikely that the west
gate was a fortification all its own (Newton 318). Though likely not a complete Hellenistic
fortification, and no other remnants of Hellenistic fortification of similar style are present on
Telendos, the west wall also differs markedly enough from the rest of Agios Konstantinos that a
later date is not out of the realm of possibility. Another strong possibility is that the west wall
made use of spolia from some small, self-contained Hellenistic fortification nearby, which has
either evaded notice or been destroyed.
This, however, brings additional challenges: namely, that the Strategos of the
Kibyrrhaiotai, at least by the early ninth century, was only ranked eleventh out of the eighteen
contemporary strategoi, and considering the theme’s focus on naval warfare, which was
generally less important to the Empire, it is unlikely that the Kibyrrhaiotai was much more
prestigious during the eighth century (Pryor & Jeffries 390-1). Later texts reinforce the sense of
the Kibyrrhaiotai’s low importance. De Ceremoniis indicates that the Strategos of the
Kibyrrhaiotai was one of those who received the minimum payment afforded to a strategos, a
mere ten pounds of gold annually, while the Taktikon Benesevic of the mid-10th century places
the Strategos’ importance at twenty-first out of thirty-eight (Pryor & Jeffries 391). Even though
the kastra almost certainly predate the Kibyrrhaiotai, the relative unimportance of the region as
part of the Empire’s defenses, as indicated by the salaries of its later protectors, can be
extrapolated to earlier periods.
As for the possibility of the construction being locally motivated, there are three possible
forms such motivation might have taken, presented here in order of least to most likely. First,
these fortifications could have been ordered by a single prominent wealthy local or very small
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group to consolidate power while meeting the threat of raids, while exerting control over the
island’s population, or by empowered officials as protection for assets they claimed. This more
selfish motivation, of course, relies on a great deal of wealth being present in Kalymnos
independent of imperial salary. This may have been the case considering the finds at Galatiani,
but the scale of the kastra would represent a considerable cost; such private fortifications were
rare within the Empire, where defensive works were often manifestations of authority (Neville
39-40; Shimoda 35). Additionally, the dispersed pattern of the settlements would make little
sense unless multiple such people collaborated in their goals, but not enough to agree on a
common site. Overall, this explanation is rather flawed, but not impossible, considering the
potential value of sea trade for the island.
The second possibility is that the kastra were funded by a local imperial official on behalf
of the Kalymnians, which represents a more justifiable use of salary (such as it would have
been), and explains the seeming concurrence of houses and walls. On the other hand, this
explanation still requires either significant expenditure, which may have exceeded such an
official’s wealth, or convincing the people to labor at a discount, a potentially unacceptable risk
for commoners when moving to the Vathy Valley remained an option. Moreover, such an official
would be hard pressed to oversee or in any way control the construction of three fortifications
which even today are at least an hour apart by car and ferry, let alone by foot; one site is atop a
mountain, and another requires crossing a channel. The best evidence in favor of this origin is the
coordinated and intervisible nature of the fortifications, which look to have been built with some
level of military expertise. Considering that Roman officials in charge of territory were almost
always military commanders as well during this period, the level of coordination evident in the
plans implies that a military officer at least had a hand in organizing, coordinating, or planning
34
the features of the fortifications, regardless of what their specific origin was. However, given
such an official’s duties would have involved naval warfare, it is still unlikely that they would
spend time and resources paying for and directing such small and disparate communities.
The third and final possible explanation is that the efforts were the product of collective
action, and that there was no order to fortify, but rather that people moved of their own accord,
congregating in defensible places, and building walls to defend themselves. This explanation
benefits from a decreased reliance on personal expenditures, as higher officials would essentially
be subsidizing and directing an ongoing population movement, with people under their own
direction more likely to work cheaply or for free. Fear of the Arabs may have been a motivator.
Raids, after all, are partially intended to demoralize the enemy, and if Kalymnos had been
subjected to a raid while undefended, a communal effort would be all the more salient.
Moreover, despite the excellent siting and fortification of these sites, and their possession of
large, public cisterns, the actual organization of houses and household cisterns inside is as
chaotic as any village, and the small cisterns are highly distinct from the large (probably
communal) ones (Koutellas, "Ta Kastra," 437). All of this indicates that these fortifications were
planned, while the settlements inside them grew more organically. Assuming that the same
people built everything, and that nobody paid the cost of bringing in large crews of expert
masons, this marked difference in architectural priority and level of organization is a logical
result of a populace’s work being primarily self-motivated, but directed or aided from above.
This explanation accounts best for the dispersal of population across the three fortified
settlements, because the most cost- and labor-efficient decision for an effort directed by a single
big spender would be to resettle in a single large place, requiring less fortification effort in total
than the sum of the three extant locations. Thus, any aid would have been supplemental or
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advisory rather than foundational. The final piece of evidence suggesting this is the notable lack
of engraved dedications at any of the three kastra. Considering the use of imperial dedications
elsewhere (e.g. Samos as mentioned above), and the presence of multiple heraldic dedicatory
reliefs on the two post-Roman castles (the modern Chora Kastro and Chrysocheria), their
absence from the three seventh-century fortifications is conspicuous enough to suggest no single
individual could reasonably claim responsibility for their construction.
Regardless of the ultimate source of the order to build, the dispersal implies that work
must have been, at least on some level, locally motivated. For instance, Telendos has little to
warrant being so heavily fortified, or even continue being inhabited to any significant degree,
unless there were already people living there in the process of moving away from the coasts.
In sum, the textual evidence suggests that the Kalymnian kastra were much more
localized projects than the grand constructions that historians attribute to emperors and strategoi,
possibly created by an officer of the Karabisianoi, but much more likely built entirely on the
initiative of the Kalymnians, perhaps with minor external aid.
Conclusion
The three seventh-century kastra of Kalymnos and Telendos represent the greatest
window into the lives of these islands’ inhabitants. More broadly, these sites have great potential
to aid in reconstructing the details of Roman fortification strategies and approaches in the face of
one of the most devastating blows the Empire ever suffered. Though the histories generally
bypass Kalymnos, its storied neighbors provide valuable comparanda, and extrapolations from
historical data provide an opportunity to understand the threats Kalymnians (and Aegean
islanders more broadly) faced, and to what degree they might have been considered worthy of
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aid by outside benefactors. Though Kalymnos was almost certainly raided, and it was by no
means cut off from the outside world, it was still peripheral by comparison to wealthier
neighboring islands, making judgements about the origin of the building program difficult. Even
though it is unlikely that the kastra were refuges, without solid evidence that people were
dwelling in greater numbers outside their walls, as a result of the island not having been fully
archaeologically surveyed, the refuge concept cannot be fully dismissed out of hand. Finally, the
degree of local versus external influence in the building of the kastra is difficult to determine, but
it can be safely ruled out that the projects were ordered by the Emperor, and, even if they were
built entirely on local initiative, it is almost certain that military expertise went into their
construction, whether from higher up the chain of command, or from experienced locals. Much
of the writing about the kastra of Kalymnos exudes an air of assuredness, despite the lack of
extensive study. Thus, even though this chapter creates more questions than it answers, perhaps
that is for the best.
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Chapter 2: Theory
In examining decision-making of people many centuries removed from the present,
analytical frameworks based in broad utilitarian logic represent the most appropriate way to
interpret the fragmentary evidence. This study relies heavily on a materialist, formalist analysis
of the fortifications of Kalymnos (LeClair 1188), situating the structures, their builders, and their
inhabitants, in primarily tactical and secondly economic landscapes, through the lens of
landscape archaeology (Ashmore & Knapp 4-5; Athanassopoulos & Wandsnider).
Landscape archaeology is based on the understanding that an area’s landscape has
significance to its inhabitants far beyond the physical topography, and the meanings assigned to
it and evaluations made of it vary based on context (Ashmore & Knapp 3-5). While landscape
archaeology contains many different ways of viewing an environment, the primary concerns of
this study will be the economic and military/tactical landscape of Kalymnos. Specifically, the
economic landscape of Kalymnos is understood first and foremost as an island with difficult
overland passage, and thus the most important component of the economic landscape is
proximity to the sea broadly, and to landing sites more specifically. The secondary concern of the
economic landscape is access to specific resources, of which the most important is building
material, followed closely by water, which, owing to the lack of natural sources, is a key
consideration of each site. The rocky landscape of Kalymnos, when understood as an economic
landscape, suddenly becomes one of tremendous costs and opportunities, where soft stone
overlies much harder material, efficiency of transport is drastically altered by the method used
and is often very low, and old ruins with fine stonework abound, but often in out-of-the-way
places. While the question of spolia is not fully settled, it is interesting to note that the tactical
landscape often became part of the cultural landscape, as many a church on Kalymnos is built
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from pieces of old fortification walls, and one is even a fortress itself. Fresh water is a very
temporary feature of the Kalymnian landscape, but, owing to the sparse vegetation, its impacts
are drastic. The paths water takes were of incredible importance to premodern Kalymnians, for
whom large cisterns were a necessity of survival; small, wonder, then, that the most impressive
buildings by far (save churches) at each of the kastra are their cisterns, which often compete for
the largest structures as well, and always come in multiples. Of tertiary concern is the
productivity of the landscape, given far less emphasis owing to the simple fact that there is
essentially no evidence from which to work, due to the extreme durability of terrace walls, which
mean the kastra could be situated right next to their original farmed plots, or the terraces could be
mere decades old; without at least a survey, or better an analysis of soils, there is no evidence
upon which to apply this framework.
The military landscape of Kalymnos is both the most granular in its understanding of
topography, as well as the most abstract in terms of its utility. The granular quality of the military
landscape is a result of the highly varied and rough terrain of the island, where small ridges,
steep banks, and sharp drops can result in two parallel-running gullies being drastically different
tactical environments, one of which is perfectly suited for defense, the other of which is far less
advantageous. The tactical landscape must be understood at all the levels on which the
technology and defensive strategies of the Kalymnians were capable of operating. At the
grandest scale, the tactical landscape is altered at the speed of light, as the sightlines of
watchmen, obscurement by terrain, and communication via signal fire or smoke have the
potential to fundamentally shift the nature of a battlefield, where an enemy can encounter
unprepared villagers, or a ready and waiting defending force. Though the digital elevation
models available for the region lack the resolution to allow examination of it in GIS, the tactical
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landscape is fundamentally dominated by sight at the smaller scale as well, where a defender’s
available targets, their profiles, and the available angles of attack all rely first and foremost on
visual confirmation. The tactical landscape can also be simplified down until it is simply various
degrees of inhibition of movement, or, in perhaps its most detailed manifestation, as all of the
various non-human or armament factors affecting engagement between combatants, from
obvious factors such as cover, elevation, and footing, to even seemingly inconsequential details,
such as the position of the sun and the resultant shadows and reflections, the impediments
deflecting a cooling breeze from reaching tired warriors, or even the coriolis effect
ever-so-slightly altering the expected course of projectiles. Put simply, there is tremendous
variation in the tactical landscape, but the primary considerations which will be focused upon are
visibility, both at an island-wide and an engagement scale, difficult terrain and beneficial
positions (almost always for missile weapons), and transportation and travel.
Owing to the tremendous gulf of cultural context and time between this study and its
subjects, a formalist approach underlies all evaluations of decision-making. The time of the Arab
raids was one when island populations would likely have been concerned first and foremost with
survival. Thus, the most obvious motive to assign to decisions is one of minimizing expenditures
while maximizing benefits (LeClair 1188).
It bears noting that a simple cost-benefit analysis based on survival becomes complicated
due to the non-fortification building activities of the Roman Kalymnians. Like many Greek
islands, Kalymnos possesses a staggering number of churches, many of which survive only as
foundations. Some of these churches were possible erected during the period of the Arab raids,
and often far away from known population centers of the time. Moreover, these churches could
even be built of finer material than the fortification walls of the kastra. As a natural consequence
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of the Christian Roman tendency to catastrophize and emphasize piety in the face of disaster,
church-building was simply another avenue of attempting to better one’s situation. Notably, each
kastro contains a church (Agios Konstantinos’ eponymous basilica would have been huge), and
many of the island’s late antique/early medieval churches are located in the safer Vathy Valley.
Indeed, quite a few prominent churches were abandoned during the seventh century on the
mainland; it seems that the impulse to build churches was not stronger than the need for physical
security.
Under a formalist analysis, the kastra are already remarkably efficient, suggesting that the
model is an adequate one for these specific sites. Put simply, they enclose large living areas with
relatively small volumes of wall, while also creating fearsome defensive positions without even
substantially altering the landscape. Moreover, considering the kastra were likely local
developments, and thus lacking the investment in symbolism of an imperial project, there is all
the more reason to view them as the result of the pure drive to survive; in such instances, a model
that looks purely to resource investment and return becomes very applicable. For those at the
bottom of Maslow’s Pyramid, the only thing that matters is the climb. The bottom line is to
assume pure utilitarian rationality, and, when results differ, attempt to find meaning in the
deviation.
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Chapter 3: Materials and Methods
Apart from textual sources, the second main form of evidence in this study is drawn from
spatial analysis involving maps and photographs. The following chapter proceeds from a
discussion of methods involving direct examination of maps, to then discuss methods
increasingly reliant on GIS analysis. A ‘grain of salt’ approach would best characterise the
methods used in this study, as the mathematical logic of ArcGIS often required checking against
real-world circumstances. Below, I describe the approaches used in identifying sites, sourcing
building materials, performing terrain and route analyses, and determining firing positions and
weapon ranges of the kastra.
Site identification
Kalymnos’ many fortifications were identified through a combination of approaches,
relying heavily on anecdotal evidence of positioning provided by Dr. P. Nick Kardulias of the
College of Wooster, and my own experience on the island. Such lines of evidence were useful in
locating the pre-Roman sites of Damos, Emborio, Vathy, and Kastri, the Roman sites of Kastelli,
Agios Konstantinos, and Chora Kastro, and the Latin site of Chrysocheria. However, locating the
pre-Roman sites of Kastellas and Embolas, the Roman site of Galatiani, and various satellite
features of sites not personally visited required wholesale reliance on external sources, and
piecing together locations from small-scale maps, imprecise descriptions, and even travel blogs.
This portion of the study consumed a large amount of time, due to the often degraded nature of
these remains. The identifications were made using the highest-detail satellite and aerial imagery
available, which, for Kalymnos, was Google Maps, by a significant margin of clarity.
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Google Maps was also used as a reference for discerning features when performing
operations in ArcGIS, due to the significantly higher degree of clarity than the basemap, which
was drawn from Google Earth. Many of the aerial images presented throughout the text are taken
from Google Maps as well, due to the greater resolution.
Material Sourcing
As a component of site identification, attempts were made to locate the source of raw
material used in the fortifications. This accommodates the possibility of stone blocks being
shipped in from abroad or even from other portions of the island, while also representing, in the
closest proximity, the easiest approach to the various sites. Special priority was given to the
various cost-paths, as they suggest the easiest access, and thus likeliest route for material.
Moreover, the cost-paths have the added benefit of starting at the shore, since transporting stone
in bulk would be far easier by sea than by land, and thus is potentially the more likely method of
transportation.
To refine the search for Roman quarries, the two Hellenistic sites with likely quarries,
Damos and Kastri, were used as comparison. In both cases, the suspected quarry practically
adjoins the fortifications, and so special attention was paid to the immediate vicinity of the
kastra.
It bears noting that the assumed quarry for Kastri is only likely in comparison to the other
sites (besides Damos) which lack any clear clues. The assumption of a quarry for Kastri is based
on personal observation, and noting that the stone of the cliff walls often adjoins the ground in an
unnaturally angular manner once it gets close to ground level. Kastri’s angular portions of stone
could (though unlikely) be natural, or (less unlikely) simply be for the purpose of ground
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levelling, since stone structures once stood inside, including an olive press. The justification for
Kastri as a quarry is expanded upon later, but it should be made clear from the outset that even
these sites are potentially suspect, and yet are also all there is to go on.
In order to test the possibility that some of the kastra may have been built purely from
natural rubble, wall measurements will be combined with measurements of scree slopes in order
to obtain a rough idea of whether such a construction technique would have been practical with
local stone supplies.
Terrain and Route Analyses
Kalymnos is an island seemingly built to defy the use of digital elevation models, with a
combination of gentle slopes and precipitous drops that makes the accuracy of a digital elevation
model (DEM) for any site not personally visited highly suspect. Even the finest resolution DEM
obtained still greatly smoothed many of the rougher contours of the real landscape. While this
has obvious effects in reducing the accuracy of viewshed, cost-paths, and other analyses, the
author has taken every pain to check these against eyewitness accounts or photographs of the
terrain for accuracy.
In order to calculate routes of travel for military forces, least-cost-paths were used, taking
into account DEM data and correcting by hand where the results were impractical.
Unfortunately, the low resolution of the DEM meant that high-detail cost-pathing was not
possible, e.g. attempting to determine the easiest crossing of the Kastelli peninsula, or the easiest
way to approach Kastelli’s stairs to the upper bailey.
Route analysis for the fortresses assumed threats to the island would come from outside,
as there does not seem to be any historical indication of armed conflict between polities on the
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island. Thus, obtaining landing zones also presented unique methodological challenges.
Landings were sorted into two categories- those that were (presumably) accessible throughout
the island’s history, and those that were only accessible after the sinking of the Pothaia isthmus.
Most of these landing sites were selected based on beaches visible from satellite photography,
and where possible have been personally viewed to ensure they are at a reasonable slope; many
are confirmed locations of access from ancient times (Bean & Cook 130-133). However, to
identify additional landings, two approaches were cross-applied. First, a dataset containing
polygons which identify all the modern beaches of Kalymnos was obtained and checked against
the identified landings; other than the two western sites on Telendos, all identified landings lined
up with modern beaches. Second, using military analytical think tank Global Security’s
guidelines on amphibious landings, shoreline areas with a gradient between 1:15 and 1:60 were
mapped, resulting in a boolean map of beaches with landable inclines (Pike 1993).
The reasoning behind using slope as the primary element of landability is tied to the types
of vessels employed by the Arabs. Arab vessels of the seventh century were primarily
shalandiyat, monoreme vessels of very similar form to the contemporary dromon (Konstam &
Dennis 32). Both navies later diversified as their mainstay vessels evolved into biremes, creating
new ship types to fill the light and low-manpower role; the Arabs developed galeai, which were
notably light and swift (Pryor & Jeffries 190-191). The light vessels of the seventh century, with
lower manpower and shallower draughts, would likely be able to come very close to shore, if not
beach directly; considering how much more expedient embarking directly would be, and the
importance of speed in conducting a raid, the selected landing sites are likely a strong
approximation of the directions from which the kastra would be threatened (Pryor & Jeffries
190-191; Konstam & Dennis 32). Such ships lacked auxiliary craft.
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Firing Positions
Range increments have been drawn in order to determine the ‘reach’ of each fortification,
i.e. its ability to project threat without its occupants having to risk themselves on the field of
battle or run down an enemy. Ranges were obtained using the buffer tool, and as a result do not
take elevation into account, but provide a rough visualization of the reach of these fortresses.
This analysis would be greatly aided by the use of proper military spatial analysis tools, which
allow for calculations such as determining projectile range based on elevation and various
ballistic factors. Such toolsets are proprietary and expensive, however. Regardless, the simplicity
of creating range increments with buffering belies its effectiveness, because the elevated
positions of the kastra mean that the range of projectiles would likely be longer than that
indicated by the mapping, and so this technique serves as a low-end-of-average estimate.
The firing arcs taken from these weapon ranges all suffer from the drawback of being
based on presumed tower locations. The difficulty lies in the fact that, while Kastelli has clear
towers, Agios Konstantinos and Galatiani are much less clear on this count; the promontory
bastions of the former and the northern gate and plateau bastions of the latter are likely spots for
elevated firing positions, but other than that, guesswork is involved. While all three sites have
walls too thick for them to be mere barriers, they are also (aside from the much thicker walls
around the western gate of Agios Konstantinos) at the cusp of being wide enough to confidently
assume a walkway. Kastelli’s sea walls, the best preserved of its components, feature a
parapet-walk that would be narrow but passable (fig. 7). Indeed, photographs from the early 20th
century depict the crenellations of the sea walls clearly enough to definitively rule out that they
are mere features of the walls’ decay, thereby verifying that they were intended to serve as
fighting platforms (fig. 8) (Gerola 59). With this in mind, the width of this wall will be measured,
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and compared to the other fortifications. Walls of equal or greater thickness can safely be
assumed to have had walkways, while those thinner are more in doubt.
Fig. 7. Kastelli’s southern long wall with parapet-walk visible, taken in 1989 from the akropolis. Kardulias, P. Nick,
August 1989.
Fig. 8. Kastelli’s southern long wall, with crenellations visible. “Fig. 53 - Calamo - Castelo de Kasteli.” Reproduced
from  “Monumenti Medievali delle Tredici Sporadi.” by G. Gerola. Annuario della regia Scuola Archeologica di
Atene, vol. 2, 1915, p. 59.
Galatiani and Agios Konstantinos, unlike Kastelli, both lack any preserved crenellations,
let alone walkways. However, Koutellas’ Ta Byzantina Kastra Ths Kalymnou reconstructs both
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sites (as well as Kastelli) with walkways and crenellations, though he does not address the reason
behind this choice (Koutellas, “Ta Kastra,” 65-67). While photographs of Agios Konstantinos
may show holes for timbers which would support a wooden walkway, all photographs of the
walls lack sufficient resolution to determine if the holes are intentional, the result of collapse, or
merely visual noise from the images themselves. Thus, this study will remain agnostic about
assigning new firing positions to the kastra based on their walltops, since Galatiani and Agios
Konstantinos are unclear, and Kastelli’s plethora of towers means that the indicated fields of fire
would not change by much.
Weapon Ranges
With firing positions established, range increments can be drawn outward from them,
giving an indication of the defenders’ reach when under attack.
The first range increment represents maximum range for accurate sling-shooting by a
decently experienced user (Marsden 94). Slings were near-ubiquitous in the Mediterranean, and
would have been highly effective at close range (Marsden 95). Slings represented a powerful
weapon even against armor, and their ease of manufacture, as well as ability to use any
appropriately sized stone as makeshift ammunition, represent a far more ‘sustainable’ weapon
than the bow, in the context of a protracted engagement. The slinger’s ideal equipment would of
course be a durable, purpose-made sling, with premade sling bullets, either stone or metal, but
they could make use of much rougher weapons and ammunition, which notably would not be
nearly as durable or identifiable in the archaeological record. Combined with their far greater
ease of production in comparison to bows, proficiency with slings was also quite commonplace,
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as the Strategikon of Maurikios indicates that even the servants of a soldier on campaign would
be proficient enough with slings to guard an army’s fortified camp (Maurikios 71).
Bows were generally neglected weapons among Greek-speaking peoples, and later the
Romans, until roughly the 4th-5th century AD, after which they became increasingly prized,
coinciding with the rise in prominence of horse archers amongst Roman military ranks (Coulston
179). These bows tended to be powerful composite bows of horn construction, capable of firing
some 300 meters with decent shot groupings from a highly trained archer (K.C. Randall 48). This
distance has been taken as a long range, suitable for harassing targets, but unlikely to inflict
massive casualties. It is also worth noting that Kalymnos, owing to its lack of forests, has very
little game to hunt, so archers would almost by necessity have learned the skill for military
purposes- this would, if subsistence were the only factor, result in very few men being proficient
with a bow as opposed to a sling, which is more useful for hunting the various small fauna and
vermin that live on Kalymnos. However, the Strategikon of Maurikios, written likely within a
century of the construction of the kastra, stipulates that all Roman men under 40 should possess a
bow and quiver, whereas foreigners are exempt (Maurikios 12). Without any archaeological
evidence of bows on the island, and Newton’s tantalizing mention of bronze arrowheads at
Christos Tou Ierousalim having no further detail, it cannot be stated with certainty that such
weapons were widespread (Newton 307). Given that the kastra were most likely built while
Kalymnos was part of the Karabisianoi fleet, there is a possibility that such requirements would
have been significantly relaxed, since it would not have provided soldiers, other than possibly
marines or rowers. None of the evidence against the use of bows is conclusive, however, and so
they will be treated as a key component of the kastra’s defenses.
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A special type of weapon, sadly lacking in details pertinent to mapping, is the solenarion,
essentially an arrow-guide allowing Roman archers to fire short darts with their bows (Maurikios
197; Nishimura 422-525). Such darts supposedly had a much longer range and velocity than
standard arrows, in addition to being far more economical in terms of volume and weight per
unit of ammunition (Nishimura 429). However, their range is a somewhat open question, with
some estimates going up to double that of a standard arrow, while somewhat criticized
reproductions have resulted in more modest range improvements, and, on the other end of the
spectrum, wind-tunnel tests have yielded estimates in excess of 500 meters (Nishimura 429). In
general, if solenaria were employed, a 400-meter range increment would thus seem a fair
approximation. For reasons outlined below, the 400-meter increment will serve a dual purpose.
Artillery is the third ranged weapon system of note, arriving (though perhaps not to
Kalymnos) in the late Classical period, spreading during the Hellenistic, and becoming much
more complex throughout the Roman period (Marsden 2, 54, 75, 176-178). Pre-medieval
artillery can be broken down into two general groups of relevance to this discussion:
stone-throwing artillery and bolt-throwing artillery, which, speaking very broadly, filled the roles
of anti-materiel and anti-personnel weaponry, respectively (Marsden 96).
While the likelihood that the defense of Kalymnos warranted the construction of large
stone-throwing artillery seems low, it is worth considering the presence of artillery in general, as
the presence of such weaponry would have had a transformative effect on the island’s
fortification layout. The problem with such weapons lies in the ease of their detection, which
tends toward both extremes of difficulty, depending on the component in question.
Stone-throwing engines themselves were largely wooden, with few metal components, all of
which are essentially useless for any other purpose save to be melted down, be they from a
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trebuchet or mangonel. On the other hand, the ammunition (large stones) of such weapons
preserves excellently. However, the easily-detected ammunition would lie in unexcavated sites,
as slightly rounder stones amidst heaps of collapsed building rubble, hillside scree, and housing
foundations, making it difficult to definitively rule against, but providing no evidence in favor of
their presence.
Stone-throwing artillery is very unlikely to have been a significant feature on Kalymnos
during the seventh century. Given the island’s deforestation and peripheral nature, neither the
long timbers nor the highly specialized military engineering knowledge needed to create such
artillery would likely have been present on Kalymnos. Finally, owing to their size and general
use as offensive siege weapons rather than defensive ones, they can be safely discounted as
having been a significant consideration in the planning of the island’s defensive works (Stouraitis
375-376).
Bolt-throwing machines were accurate long-range anti-personnel weapons, and featured
in Roman military arsenals until at least the 10th century, if not later, seemingly never being fully
supplanted by trebuchets or mangonels, but rather by western crossbows in the 11th century
(Dennis 106; Stouraitis 373). Such artillery is far better suited to Kalymnos’ kastra, for many
reasons. First, the engines were significantly smaller than stone-throwers, and thus could have
been mounted in the relatively small towers, and on ramparts. Second, given the likely small
numbers of combatants on each side, accurate and deadly bolt-throwers would remain extremely
useful, due to their power, range, and accuracy. By comparison, stone-throwers required larger
multi-person crews which would mean fewer archers or slingers defending the walls, fired in
higher arcs and thus were less precise, and generally had a much shorter range. The only
significant benefit of stone-throwers would be their potential to seriously damage enemy ships or
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threaten to do so, potentially delaying or entirely averting a raid. While this would be a valuable
tactical advantage, it is worth considering that bows had generally longer ranges than
stone-throwing artillery (Dennis 107). Given that bow ranges do not extend significantly past the
shore at any site except Kastelli, there is little to no chance that defenders would have been able
to target enemy ships with stone-throwing artillery at Galatiani or Agios Konstantinos, both of
which have far more potential firing positions for such large engines.
Thus, for the Roman fortifications, an additional range increment has been included, as
an indication of the range of bolt-throwing artillery, and stone-throwing artillery has been
discounted as a possibility. This range increment extends out to approximately 500 meters, with
some variance based on height being estimated due to the lack of access to ESRI’s official
military toolset. This range represents roughly the maximum range of Roman bolt-throwers,
whereas accurate aiming range would fall somewhere within the previously established
maximum bowshot range, likely in the neighborhood of 200 to 300 meters (Rossi 76-81).
However, it is worth noting that ancient bolt and stone-throwers potentially were mechanically
accurate out to their maximum ranges, so larger targets, such as ships or concentrated groups of
men, would likely still face a significant threat at the maximum range increment (Marsden 94).
The small size of Hellenistic fortifications make it somewhat doubtful that artillery were
being employed in these locations, as artillery of the time was most often used in sieges, and
neither Kastri nor Kastellas seem built to withstand long-term sieges, judging by their lack of
identifiable cisterns. While the cities of the time may have warranted the presence of artillery,
considering that the Hellenistic poleis of other islands such as Chios and Samos demanded young
men practice the use of artillery, the lack of preserved towers makes identifying firing arcs
virtually impossible (Marsden 54). For the sake of completeness, shorter-ranged artillery
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increments of 400 meters maximum, commensurate with the ranges of early artillery pieces,
have been added to Kastri, due to its identifiable towers (Marsden 86).
Roman fortifications, however, all seem more fit for the use of bolt-throwing artillery,
featuring numerous bastions, possible crenellations, and (at Kastelli) towers, and thus artillery
firing increments have been added to all of the Roman fortifications. This is not to indicate that
these weapons were necessarily in common use, but simply that the fortifications were suitable
for their deployment. Due to the complicated and obscure history of torsion artillery after
antiquity, the same increment of 400 meters as used at Kastri was applied to the three
seventh-century kastra as well, serving as a highly plausible baseline, with the acknowledgement
of the potential for longer ranges as well.
As for stone-throwing artillery, Roman armies had been using traction trebuchets for
potentially up to a century before the kastra were built (Dennis 104). This is a considerable
amount of time for their proliferation, and thus, while the kastra may not have been clearly
designed with them in mind, stone-throwers could have been a feature of the defense at various
times. However, if they were, it is unclear what military advantage they would offer in
comparison to giving the entire artillery crew bows or slings, or even large rocks to drop by hand
from the ramparts. With this in mind, they have not been added to the map.
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Chapter 4: Results
Examination of the several lines of investigation outlined above provided valuable
insights on the nature of the kastra. Below are listed the results of the investigations that
produced information with measurable qualities. These include efforts to determine material
sourcing, examinations of terrain and movement cost, and attempts to locate firing positions.
Material Sourcing
Unfortunately, no writings suggest anyone has previously searched for the sources of
stone used in Kalymnos’ Roman kastra. There are only two fortifications for which clear and
likely sources of stone exist, and both are Hellenistic. The first is Damos’ akropolis wall, which,
according to Newton, is practically on top of its quarry (Newton 301). This quarry has been
confirmed by photographic evidence taken by P. Nick Kardulias in the 1980s, though the site is
currently obscured from the air by heavy foliage. The second such site is Kastri, because the
regular right angles formed between the internal ground level and the shelves leading up to cliff
faces surrounding it suggest the removal of blocks. Moreover, the combination of the
fortification wall and the cliff walls’ matching stone, as well as the sharp incline up to Kastri,
suggest that the blocks are from within the site, and that bringing such huge stones from
elsewhere would be a monumental task to enclose such a small area. Sadly, other than Kastri and
the Damos Akropolis, the other sources will remain a mystery, as no other quarries were located.
However, the presence of sizeable scree slopes at Galatiani and Agios Konstantinos may
present sources for stones that were then only slightly altered by local masons. In order to test
this possibility, an area of the Agios Konstantinos gully lying within the walls and exhibiting
large amounts of loose stone was measured. The total area of this scatter is approximately 1,649
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square meters. Owing to the incredible mathematical complexity and randomness involved in the
way scree slopes form, no comprehensive breakdowns of the composition of such formations
was available, and thus the following calculations will rely heavily on conservative estimates
based on personal experience with the island’s geology (Kirby & Statham 359-362). The
following calculation will assume that 50% of stones in a scree slope are usable (probably a low
estimate given the roughness of the walls), and that the average building stone is around 30 cubic
centimeters, with scarce but valuable larger stones and common but mostly-filler smaller stones
both being conflated into that average. Again being conservative, the scree will be assumed at a
depth of one such average stone.
With the above figures in mind, the scree slope in question would hold a total of 2,748
usable stones, for a total volume of approximately 74.2 cubic meters of building material.
Assuming the walls rose to approximately 2.5 meters, and are within Koutellas’ stated range of
1-1.5 meters thick including mortar, a mere 80-meter stretch of streambed could supply enough
stone to complete 30 meters of defensive wall purely built of stone, and likely far more once
mortar was added. The unusable pieces of stone would also be a source of limestone powder for
use in mortar. If all of Agios Konstantinos’ area supplied rubble, even taking only 5% of the
theoretical ‘rocks’ (the 30cm square units) within the walls rather than the 50% from the
streambed would result in 18,564 stones, enough for 501 cubic meters of building material, or
200 meters of mortarless wall. Considering the northern wall of Agios Konstantinos is only
about 270 meters long, combined with the prevalence of other scree slopes and the likely far
higher percentage of usable rocks, it seems safe to assume that Agios Konstantinos’ walls could
easily have been built entirely from rubble. It is also noteworthy that these calculations omitted
55
the areas outside the walls; such a distinction would have been immaterial before the walls had
been constructed, which is the purpose of these calculations in the first place.
Terrain
All landing areas other than Masouri and West Telendos were identified as possessing the
correct gradient for amphibious landing. However, having personally visited the shore at
Kantouni, it is an extremely easy place to land, and the DEM is somewhat inaccurate in this area.
Additionally, despite the two lines of evidence implying that West Telendos’ landing site was
impractical, these indications run up against the fact that Agios Konstantinos features a western
defensive installation directly facing this landing site, with perhaps two layers of defense,
extremely broad walls, and significant bastions. The final issue arose in that there were multiple
indications that the shoulders of the Kastelli peninsula may be suitable landing sites. However,
not only would these locations be quite easily within bowshot, and within the close range interval
of the southern wall, but images from dive tours around the peninsula indicate that much of the
peninsula is nearly a sheer cliff under the water, and that the boolean’s interpretation of gentle
slopes on the shoulders is much more a result of its low resolution than the actual nature of the
land, as images show two to three-meter rock faces above the water. This served as a strong
cautionary tale on the extent to which one can trust a DEM on an island made of rocks (fig. 9).
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Fig. 9. Map of travel cost from various landing points. Note how rapidly the cost increases outside the small valleys.
Map of Kalymnos, Greece from: "Kalymnos, Greece" Map, Google Maps.
Firing Positions: Towers and Walltops
The identification of towers was complicated by their rarity. Still, potential bastions were
located at each site, and towers at Kastelli as well. The identification of Kastelli’s akropolis
towers was likely overzealous, as on-the-ground photos show at least one of the identified
structures to be one of the kastro’s cisterns, and several are likely houses as well; identification
of the lower bailey’s towers was entirely in line with the conclusions of Koutellas ( “Ta Kastra”
433). However, this part of the identification process was primarily about finding firing
positions, towers simply being the most obvious manifestation. Thus, taking into account the
structures were likely flat roofed, and the cistern retains part of its vaulted ceiling, as well as the
height of the akropolis and the uncertain height of the upper walls, it is entirely possible that such
structures could still have served as secondary firing positions. The nearby tower would naturally
be the most advantageous and offer the best cover to defenders, but there would be no reason to
pass up the elevated position of the inner rooftops unless the wall rose higher and blocked them
from line of sight, which would require deeper investigation to determine. With all this in mind,
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the falsely identified towers of Kastelli will still be considered firing positions, along with the
correctly identified ones.
As for bastions, there is a possibility that the two northern wall projections at Galatiani
are merely areas where the wall has slumped outward, giving it the appearance of protruding
from above. However, the height of the wall in this area is unknown, so it is impossible to
determine at present whether it even has sufficient height for this to occur, let alone whether its
construction would allow this rather than causing it to simply break apart. The walls of Agios
Konstantinos seem to have broken down into scree rather than bend, so the lack of obvious
debris makes the identification as bastions more plausible.
Attempting to identify ramparted walls was difficult. Due to several factors interfering
with the accuracy of measuring wall thickness, the results will be treated as a range, and checked
against the metrics provided by Koutellas. As stated in chapter 3, ramparts will be assumed for
walls around the thickness of Kastelli’s sea wall, and put into doubt if any thinner. Where
conflict exists between the author’s measurements and those of in-person observers, the
in-person observations will take precedence due to the above-mentioned difficulties in
measurement.
Distance measurements were taken first at the sea-wall of Kastelli, one in the middle of
its course, one near where it joins the lower bailey, and one near the sea. The three measurements
all fall in the range of 1.5-2 meters. Unfortunately, no in-person measurements of the walls’
thickness exist for comparison. Galatiani’s single continuous wall varied quite widely in its
thickness, from over 2m near the southern gate, to well under a meter on the western cliff face,
0.6m and 0.8m south and north respectively, and thickening again to 1.4-1.8m in the area of the
northern gate. These measurements roughly agree with Koutellas’ in-person measurements of
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1.6-2 meters thickness (Koutellas, “Ta Kastra,” 65). Finally, Agios Konstantinos’ walls proved
quite thick; measuring at five points from east to west, the main wall was 1.5m thick at the
promontory (where it mostly served to reinforce the slope), 1.8m thick a short way east of the
gate, 1.9m thick a short way west of the gate, 1.7m thick at the area where the concavity ends
and the wall runs straighter, and 1.8m thick near the end of its course. However, Koutellas
reports the walls averaging a thickness of 1 to 1.5 meters, making these results highly suspect
(Koutellas, “Ta Kastra,” 67).
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Chapter 5: Discussion
This chapter will first move through several lines of analysis, drawing conclusions as to
what they reveal about the kastra. These topics are the sources of material, the presence/absence
of ramparts, the anomalous case of Hellenistic Kastellas as a point of contrast to the Roman
kastra, trends in the shape of walls, an examination of how flanking is facilitated in each of the
kastra, and finally the intervisibility of the three sites. After examination of these topics, I
address the degree to which I can answer the research questions posed at the outset of the present
study.
Material Sources
The lack of likely quarries besides Kastri and potentially the Damos akropolis has
provided very little basis for determining the manner in which material was sourced and utilized
in the construction of the kastra. Even beyond the gulf of roughly a millennium separating Kastri
and Damos from the Roman kastra, the combination of the Hellenistic sites’ very small surviving
walls, tiny enclosed area, and highly porous surrounding rock makes them only very rough
analogies for the later kastra. Moreover, the masonry of the Hellenistic fortifications involves
very large and regular blocks, which are likely more difficult (but also more worthwhile) to
transport than the smaller, irregular stones of the Roman kastra. Thus, attempting to use Kastri
and Damos for comparison was already somewhat dubious, and, in the end, did not provide
enough guidance to produce results.
Unfortunately, despite being the only sites with likely quarries nearby, Kastri and Damos
are almost certainly not the source of the stone used in other fortifications, or at least cannot be
confirmed as such, for several reasons. The most noteworthy reason is that neither site has
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produced any evidence of occupation after the Hellenistic period, and certainly not into late
antiquity or beyond. Though a quarry could be a site purely for extraction, it would be strange to
see work carried out in defensible and formerly inhabited places without anyone making any
detectable use of them, considering they would have been there for long periods of time. As for
Kastri, though it benefits from being relatively near a port, considering the greater ease of
moving such heavy material on a circuitous and hilly land route, the steep slope of the hill
leading up to the fortress would have been a death trap for any involved in carrying heavy things
downward, and likely impossible for beasts of burden to make the journey upward if carrying
significantly more than what a person could carry. Moreover, while it is possible and even likely
that many traces of the quarrying have vanished due to weathering and collapse over the
centuries, the sheer quantity of stone required for the three kastra could not have been extracted
from Kastri or Damos without leaving traces that would be much more significant than those
present today. Damos faces this difficulty less, due to having a much more verifiable and
significant source of stone, and the location of its quarry on flatter ground makes it a more
tempting location. However, its position well inland in the southern valley and its distance from
seventh-century population centers makes it an unlikely candidate.
The failure to source the material may be a result of the quarries being functionally
undetectable. There are three possible explanations: that the sites are now gone, that the sites are
hidden, or that little to no quarrying was involved. Some blend of these three ideas may also be
possible. Notably, these explanations, while some have limited applicability to other periods,
only intend to cover the seventh-century Roman kastra, since the obstacles and distances
between them and the fortifications from other periods mean that they would have a vanishingly
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small likelihood of sharing the same source of stone (again, assuming the stone was Kalymnian
and not shipped in).
The first possibility, that the source or sources are now gone, has several different
permutations, all of which fall under the umbrella of erosion. Kalymnos’ limestone geology has
produced several sinkholes on the northern coast which appear full of loose stone, and several of
the areas of coastal cliff are eroding into the sea, some in large chunks. Moreover, the mountains
are constantly creating vast scree slopes, which could easily bury a quarry. The sinkholes’
remoteness from the inhabited areas and kastra is less of an issue due to the only access being by
ship--thus, anyone arriving there would have the means of transporting material already with
them. Still, the sinkhole possibility seems remote, as the only possible motivation would be that,
owing to Kalymnos’ geology, harder rock layers can be found down below, and thus the
sinkholes have the potential to grant access to superior material. Their use strains the economic
logic of the builders, and thus does not warrant much consideration. Much more likely is that the
erosion of coastal areas may have destroyed the quarry/ies. Since stone would be most easily
transported by ship, coastal quarries would be the most efficient, since they remove the entire
first leg of the process by having the ship adjacent to the production area. Moreover, coastal
cliffs would be an ideal location for a quarry considering they feature exposed stone, and often
deeper water, allowing ships to anchor closer to shore. Considering the coastal cliffs on the north
side of the Telendos bay seem to be the most rapidly-eroding part of the island, falling off in
huge iceberg-like chunks; this possibility would both be the most destructive of the site/s, while
also being the second most reasonable in terms of proximity and transportation for Agios
Konstantinos and Kastelli. The only potential shortcoming of this proposal is the fact that, if the
quarry was dug in a stepped manner, it likely would have endured much better than the
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surrounding cliffs; however, the sheer volume of rock in motion around it, as well as the lack of
certainty as to what method would have been employed, still suggests the possibility of the
quarry being destroyed in such a way. While the most logically sound solution, coastal erosion is
very difficult to falsify or verify short of chemically determining the origin of the wallstones,
since any site destroyed in such a manner would be effectively wiped from the archaeological
record entirely.
The second possibility, that the quarries are now hidden, has three permutations. First is
that the quarries have been covered over by modern settlement. There are many inclines on
Kalymnos, and, considering many people currently use bulldozers to cut into cliffsides for house
foundations, it would make a great deal of sense for (especially preindustrial) Kalymnians to
utilize an already-existing cut into a hillside. Of course, this would mostly apply to very old
structures, since modern builders would likely face legal trouble for building on an ancient site,
if it were recognized as such. Given the island’s small population outside the southern valley,
essentially being a string of hamlets on the west coast/Telendos bay where the kastra are
clustered, this seems unlikely. The second permutation of this possibility, though unlikely, is that
the island’s current massive quarry in the southern mountains has been used for a very long time;
due to the difficulty of transport to the seventh-century kastra, requiring travel over many hills
(and mountains and sea for Galatiani and Agios Konstantinos, respectively), this seems much
more unlikely than the first. Notably, this difficulty would be substantially lessened for the two
kastra of the southern valley. While still difficult, if the material was deemed superior, laborious
transportation may have been judged worthwhile.  The final possibility is that the quarry could
simply be buried or covered by plants. A divet in a hillside is exactly the type of thing that is
easily buried, and the mountains of Kalymnos are constantly producing vast scree slopes which
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could easily bury a premodern quarry, especially considering such a quarry would benefit most
from being near steep terrain. As for vegetation, a stone-bottomed quarry is a likely place for
water to accumulate, and thus plants will tend to grow thickly around such a site. In the Cypriot
town of Athienou, early 20th century looters considered particularly large and green thorn bushes
to be the best sign of a buried tomb, since the artificial aquifer-like cavity of dirt in the stone
retained water, and would grant the plant a huge advantage over others; a similar principle
applies here (Michael Toumazou, personal communication). Occlusion by dirt, rock, or plants is
one of the most plausible explanations across most of Kalymnos, but is uniquely frustrating for
this study. Without a high-resolution pedestrian survey of the island, there is little utility in trying
to determine relative bush-cluster density or scree slope length, since there are easily thousands
of both on Kalymnos, and so many confounding variables exist influencing the morphology of
both that any observation from satellite imagery is essentially useless. Still, burial is among the
strongest possibilities.
The final possibility, that there was little to no quarrying, has two distinct permutations. It
is possible that the kastra used primarily spolia, and used the material so heavily that the original
structures they took from are either not visible today, or their level of disrepair is
indistinguishable (without purposeful examination) from that of structures that were either not
recycled, or recycled with less purpose and direction. While it is possible that such material
could be shipped from where it may have been plentiful, e.g. the western shore of Telendos, such
an effort would defeat the entire purpose of using spolia, which is the relative efficiency
compared to cutting and transporting new building material, since transporting two things equal
distances will always be much more worthwhile for the purpose-made material rather than that
which is being repurposed. Put simply, a three-stage transportation process for stones that may
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not even fit the planned design would hardly be more efficient than cutting stone near the source,
and shaping it to purpose. Moreover, the very rough construction of the walls of Agios
Konstantinos and Galatiani, if they were the product of repurposing old building material, would
scarcely seem worth the effort. These walls are unlikely to merely be the remnant of a rubble
core given their use of mortar, and thus they are highly unlikely to ever have had a facing of finer
stone. The final possibility, which offers the easiest transportation of all, is that the builders may
simply have utilized local scree and ground stones, modifying them slightly, if at all. This
solution almost entirely removes the issue of transportation, for Agios Konstantinos especially,
and fits well with the relatively rough appearance of the surviving walls of the seventh-century
kastra. The sheer convenience of this method for the inhabitants, taking into account that the
construction was likely locally motivated, makes it a very strong possibility. Agios Konstantinos
especially would be the perfect location for using such material, since the concave mountain face
produces a massive rock pile that rolls part of the way down to the wall of its own accord. As
mentioned in the previous chapter, even with extremely conservative estimates limited only to
the area within the walls, the northern wall would be almost entirely buildable from loose rubble.
However, for Galatiani and Kastelli, the use of scree is less certain. Galatiani is on rocky ground,
but it lacks the prodigious scree slopes of Agios Konstantinos, at best having a small crumbling
ridge. Still, given the difficulty of moving material up the steep paths to the mountaintop,
combined with the relatively much smaller volume of wall constructed, local rocks may have
proven sufficient; without the ability to know how high the walls once were, or more detail as to
the number of structures within, the question remains very open. Kastelli, on the other hand, has
several scree slopes, none of which are tremendous, but in total appear to have a good quantity of
loose material. The difficulty with Kastelli is that the total volume of wall in the kastro is
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immense, with a wall each for the lower bailey and the akropolis, two outer stretches of wall, one
heading southward to the sea, the other heading north, and multiple towers, as well as vast
cisterns. Adding in the structures inside, it beggars belief that Kastelli could be constructed
solely from scree and ground stones. Moreover, the proximity of Kastelli to the sea, combined
with its less rugged landscape than the other two, mean that it would have been the easiest of the
sites to which to transport stone from elsewhere. Finally, various assessments of Kastelli’s
masonry describe it as superior, and photographic evidence seems to bear this out.
To summarize, the sources of the material used in the Roman kastra may have been
missed for a variety of reasons, but ruling out user error, it seems likeliest that Agios
Konstantinos was constructed largely from scavenging local rockfalls and modifying the
recovered stones, and that Kastelli was (at least in large part) built with stone scavenged
elsewhere, or mined in a quarry that is no longer identifiable as such. Galatiani is less clear than
the other two, but the use of local surface stones seems a bit more likely.
Ramparts
Attempts to measure the width of the walls at the three kastra were severely limited by
three factors. First, the mechanical accuracy of the user, as this relied heavily on eyeballing when
the cursor had been placed exactly correctly, and the image of the walls, even at maximum zoom,
is very narrow on a monitor. Second, the visual quality of the basemap, which was low enough to
make picking out the exact starting point of walls difficult, especially at Agios Konstantinos,
where the expanses of rubble adjoining the walls make determining their exact endpoint a
difficult process. Finally, the angle of the imagery was a significant challenge, as none of the
kastra walls were viewed from a directly top-down perspective, and thus the previous two
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problems were compounded by the difficulty of attempting to distinguish the top of a wall from
its side. Galatiani’s walls seemed to be the least affected by the angle of the image, possibly
because of their severely reduced state.
Still, measurements were not entirely outside the ballpark of what is reported by
Koutellas. From these measurements, a few conclusions can be drawn. With specific
measurements of Galatiani’s walls at different points, and with comparison to Kastelli’s known
ramparted wall, it can be deduced that the northern and southern gates of Galatiani could have
been flanked by ramparted walls, whereas the cliffside, western portion of its wall may have
been too thin to support them. If so, this makes a good deal of sense, as few enemies would be
willing to risk the almost-sheer climb up the west slope of Galatiani. At Agios Konstantinos, on
the other hand, despite the measurements of this study being very similar across the course of the
main wall, Koutellas reported much thinner measurements, in the range of 1.0-1.5m (Koutellas,
“Ta Kastra,” 67). Though the upper range likely would have supported a rampart, the lower
range falls well below that of Kastelli’s sea wall, thus complicating the question. Though the
concave firing position around the gate of Agios Konstantinos would be utterly wasted without
some form of firing positions, it is possible that, if ramparts were not in place, defenders may
have taken up position slightly further uphill, granting a slightly less advantageous angle of fire,
but saving considerable labor in the creation of the walls. There also remains the possibility of
wooden platforms, either directly mounted on the wall with beams installed into its structure (if
the holes existed), or simple scaffoldings erected behind it. Both of these solutions require closer
examination of the sites, and, due to the low height of its remaining walls,, the first possibility
may be impossible to test at Galatiani. To find post-holes for fighting platforms, some form of
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excavation would need to be conducted, with the hope that the soil of the steep slope has not
been too churned in the intervening millennium for such traces to be found.
Problematic Cases and Strange Routes
While the Roman kastra are the focus of this study, their predecessor fortifications exhibit
several confusing traits. While the tendency to expose the enemy’s shielded flank and to prefer
straight walls over topographically efficient ones has been stated before, another significant
discontinuity with the kastra was the pre-Roman tendency to create fortifications as counterparts
to permanent settlements, in arrangements that appear rather inefficient. This topic serves to
illustrate that, despite their inferior stonework, the kastra were far more tactically sound
fortifications than their pre-Roman counterparts.
The case of Kastellas is an interesting one, as the fortress, seemingly put in place to
overlook the town of Embolas, is quite superfluous due to its positioning. The easiest avenues of
attack against Embolas would quite clearly be from the bay of Vathy (1), from Pezonda Bay (2)
to the north, or over the mountains and into the valley of Vathy from the south, landing at Akti
Bay (3). Immediately, it is apparent that Kastellas is in a bit of a conundrum: viewshed shows
that it could see only one of these avenues of attack any better than could Embolas, that being the
southern route into Vathy around the mountains on the east coast, while cost path analyses show
that that southern route, from which it is on the other side of Embolas, is the second most
efficient route, and the northern route from Pezonda goes almost entirely out of the way of the
fortress. With the fortress neither particularly more capable of blocking or viewing avenues of
attack, its purpose is hard to determine.
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Moreover, images (figs. 11, 12) show far superior construction and height of the walls at
Embolas, seemingly making Kastellas obsolete. The question of why Kastellas was even built,
considering the fortifications seem to have been constructed at roughly the same time, is a
pressing one, as it is too far from the town to serve as an akropolis in any but the military sense,
and the only land it controls more directly than Embolas is unfarmable mountainside.
Kastri, on the other hand, is quite clear in its purpose. The fortress stands atop a crag in
the mountainside north of the village of Emborio, which seems to have been a port for as long as
the island was a worthwhile trade partner (Bean & Cook, 129). Yet, in spite of its clear purpose,
the efficacy of Kastri is somewhat questionable. The fortress is small, and, while it offers a better
view than the coastline at cove-bound Emborio, it is still nestled into a cliff face which severely
restricts the field of view. Even with forewarning of an incoming threat, the inhabitants of
Emborio would be hard pressed to make the steep climb up a gully in time, which only features
steps at the very top of the approach. The site would be almost unassailable if properly blocked
off, but the tiny space and lack of cisterns would have made it entirely unfit to withstand a siege.
With this in mind, it is unsurprising that, while Emborio carries on as a port throughout history,
the Roman Kalymnians made no use of Kastri (Heslop 39).
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Fig. 10. Views from Embolas and Kastellas, with least-coth paths included from Akti (blue) and Pezonda (North).
Coral represents areas that are visible from both locations, while blue represents areas visible only to Kastellas, and
orange represents areas visible only to Embolas. Map of Kalymnos, Greece from: "Kalymnos, Greece" Map, Google
Earth.
Figs. 11 & 12. The wall construction of Embolas (Fig. 11, left), though roughly contemporary to Kastellas (Fig. 12,
right), is clearly superior. Reproduced from “The Carian Coast III,” by G.E. Bean and J.M. Cook, 1957, The Annual
of the British School at Athens, 52, plate 26.
Though there is no evidence for Kastelli being older than the seventh century, the
association of the site as the Palaiokastro of the Gorgon suggests some have assigned it a greater
age. This can be simply refuted through multiple lines of evidence, but among the most
compelling is travel cost (fig. 13). Considering that the only relevant settlements near Kastelli
were Damos and Pothaia, if Kastelli existed at the time of the two towns, one would expect it to
be easily accessible to act as a refuge, much like Kastri or Kastellas. However, foot travel from
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Damos today takes some 80 minutes, even with modern roads, and the cost map clearly shows
that the cost of travel to Kastelli, owing to the rugged coastal terrain, is comparable, in some
places, to climbing part of a mountain. Thus, Kastelli would have been supremely useless as
anything except a settlement, because no settlement was situated to benefit from the protection of
its walls.
Fig. 13. Travel cost layer, depicting Kastelli as similarly inaccessible to a mountain slope, even from nearby
landings at Arginonta, and at Masouri, roughly in the region of where Pothaia would have stood. Kastelli is circled
in yellow, Pothaia in red, and Damos in blue. Map of Kalymnos, Greece from: "Kalymnos, Greece" Map, Google
Earth.
Wall Shape
The Roman kastra of Kalymnos have almost no straight-line walls for any significant
distance, the only example being the southern exterior wall of Kastelli which runs down to the
sea. This represents a marked departure from the Hellenistic fortifications of the island. While
Kastellas notably is quite rounded and irregular in its form, Embolas, Damos, and Kastri all
feature fortification walls that are remarkably straight given the terrain, sometimes to their
detriment. Damos’ straight-line akropolis wall is the most logical, given that the ridge on which
it stands is roughly flat, and the goal of the wall is merely to close off the one side from which
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the raised tongue of land can be accessed. Less reasonably, Embolas’ walls, though atop a short
cliff alternating with hillside, which grants them an excellent vantage over most of the Vathy
valley, continue in a straight course rather than following the contours of the ridge, often
standing slightly back from it. While potentially more stable, this would make the walls far
worse as firing positions, since, at many points, the contour of the cliff, one or two meters in
front of them, would provide enemies with cover directly adjacent to the wall, negating the
advantage of the extra height granted by the terrain. Parts of Embolas’ wall do follow the
contours of the land, especially toward the west portion and on the very eastern end, which make
the straight sections in the east all the more baffling, as they essentially grant enemies cover,
while offering no significant benefit to the defenders in return. The most baffling of the three, by
far, is Kastri, where the main flaw of its straight wall is plainly evident today: it currently bows
outward under the weight of the ground within, somewhat like a dam bursting at a glacial pace.
The uneven level of the original cliff shelf is evident from below the wall, which rises to exactly
the internal ground level, but externally is almost V-shaped due to how deeply the cliff face dips.
Considering the sheer cliff atop which it stands, and the ample coverage provided by the two
towers at either side of the shelf’s mouth, it scarcely seems necessary to utilize such fine and
labor-intensive masonry when the primary goal of the wall seems to be essentially that of a fancy
terrace wall, maintaining the artificial ground level inside. If the wall were made of smaller
stones and allowed to be somewhat concave, it would not only be much more efficient in terms
of labor, but likely much more stable as well, and follow the contours of the land much more
naturally.
By contrast, the walls of the Roman kastra, though visually less impressive due to their
less precise masonry, are far more efficient in their positioning. Galatiani is an excellent
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example, especially in comparison to Embolas. While Embolas’ walls occasionally turn their
strong position atop a short cliff into a weakness by being far back enough that the cliff could
provide cover to the enemy, Galatiani’s short southern ridge and western cliff edge are perfectly
exploited by its undulating wall, which stands almost precisely atop the edge of both formations
for as long as they persist, even on the west wall, which arguably would have been far easier to
build on the gentler inclines higher up the slope.
Right Flank Exploitation
Aegean cultures have long acknowledged that attacks to the right flank are more effective
than those targeting the left flank, due to the near-universal use of shields since at least the
Bronze Age; thus, it is somewhat surprising that Kalymnian fortifications from before the Roman
period seem unconcerned with this basic principle of ancient warfare (Coulston, 169). Turning
first to Kastellas, it is interesting to note that, if the perimeter has been correctly identified, it is
the only large fortification on Kalymnos that seemingly does not provide its occupants with any
sort of flanking position on attackers. Kastri, on the other hand, provides an extremely deep
flanking position, with roughly a 15 meter steep ascent up a staircase carved between a tower
and a cliff face, and yet the attackers would only be forced to expose their left sides, making this
a far less advantageous position. Similarly, Damos’ akropolis wall features a tower that would
have been on the left flank of the likeliest location of the gate (Newton 302). This shared trait,
seen in no other period, is hard to understand, given that shields were likely no less widespread
before the Roman period than during or immediately after it. Embolas’ lack of an identifiable
gate excludes it from the discussion. However, even half of the fortifications taking left-flank
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positions is an oddity nonetheless, given the prevalence of shields, and great difference in the
Roman kastra.
By contrast, all four Roman kastra feature examples of exploiting the right flank of an
attacking force. Kastelli amply exhibits this tactic, as the outer gate features a projection to the
right of the entrance allowing fire down on approaching foes. Furthermore, the path to the
akropolis requires attackers to expose their right sides to the defends atop the rock, surmounted
by a series of densely-packed towers, and the stairway on the cliffside features a switchback
halfway up, which results in an attacker’s right side being exposed to a tower for the final portion
of the ascent. In combination, these defensive features mean that any force attacking Kasteli
would make almost the entire journey, from outside the outer gate to the inside of the akropolis,
with their right flank exposed to enemy missiles (fig. 14).
Fig. 14. Koutellas’ plan of Kastelli, with author’s addition of a red line marking the likeliest route of attack. Adapted
from “Ta Byzantina Kastra ths Kalymnou,” by M. Koutellas, 2005, Kalymniaka Chronika, 34, p. 433.
Kastelli also, uniquely among the other fortresses of the island, is capable of completely
cutting off one of the island’s transportation routes. Were Kastelli to be equipped with
bolt-throwing artillery pieces in its towers, their range would reach from the kastro to the inland
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mountainside opposite it, rendering the entire coastal road unsafe for enemy movement, and
cutting off by far the most viable land route to Emborio and Galatiani from the favorable
landings of the southern valley. This potentially gives Kastelli the role of firebase, and lends
additional protection to Galatiani, as the easier southern approach would then only be accessible
via the much steeper ascent from the valley of Vathy (fig. 15). The other routes to Galatiani’s
southern approach involve landing at Emborio or Arginonda, which are not only easily visible
routes from Galatiani itself, but would require sailing past either Kasteli or Agios Konstantinos,
thus sacrificing the element of surprise, and potentially making attackers vulnerable to artillery
from Kastelli, if it had any. Even today, cutting off the coastal artery would deny almost all
traffic from the west coast to the rest of the island, save for by ship. According to Bean and
Cook, writing in 1957, travel around the straits of Telendos was done by ship even during their
time, meaning deeper in history it was likely near-totally seafaring, and thus the naval protection
of Kastelli and Agios Konstantinos may be the more significant factor (Bean and Cook 128).
Fig. 15. Kastelli castle with short, long, and artillery ranges indicated, showing that artillery fire could create a
beaten zone of several hundred meters along the coastal road. Map of Church of Kastro Kastelliou, Kalymnos from:
"Kalymnos, Greece" Map, Google Earth.
While Kastelli certainly features the greatest number of instances of capitalizing on
right-flank weakness, the other sites maintain the trend nonetheless. Agios Konstantinos,
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seemingly featuring the fewest towers of any of the Roman sites, at only one in the main wall,
nonetheless makes excellent use of flanking positions in its construction. The high promontory
and extending lower rampart at the far east of the fortress would have provided excellent
left-flank firing positions down into the gully which leads up to the gate. A high cliff also stands
150 meters to the right flank of the approach, which seems to bear at least some traces of
defensive structures as well, permitting harassing fire. More accurate right-flank fire could be
delivered as attackers came close to the gate, where the concavity of the surrounding walls would
grant defenders a substantial height and flank advantage, at a range of a few dozen meters at
most, while the enemy would be forced to advance in a narrow column up a gully too shallow to
provide cover, but too steep to walk steadily on its sides (fig. 16). The gully likely has not
changed much since the kastro’s occupation, due to the combination of low rainfall and the
various houses and the outer wall serving to break the flow of water. Thus, enemies approaching
the gate would be funnelled and subjected to frontal enfilading fire, as well as high-angle
flanking fire from both sides. Finally, since the path from the flat portion of Telendos (the east
shore) to the gate of Agios Konstantinos travels east-west along the coast, the easternmost
clifftop bastion would have provided a firing position from which an enemy attacking from an
east shore landing would have exposed their right flank for a great distance, with a substantial
height advantage to boot, albeit with occasional cover from the mountain slope. This firing
position, combined with the roughness of the path, would have been a strong disincentive to land
anywhere but directly below the kastro, thus sacrificing the potential element of surprise, and
likely coming under bow fire before a vessel could make landfall. If the defenders of Agios
Konstantinos were to employ artillery or solenaria, they could have targeted enemy vessels for
nearly 100 meters before they made landfall. Targets pressed together in the confines of a ship,
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some of which would have been rowers and thus defenseless, would have been an ideal target for
such long-ranged weapons. The much more impressive western wall of Agios Konstantinos
features two towers and a bastion at the higher southern part of the wall, all with an effective
view of what appears to be the gate. The extremely broad wall at the extreme right (from the
attacker’s perspective) would have allowed the deployment of sizable artillery pieces or groups
of defenders, and was likely built as a platform for just such a purpose, or else to bear some sort
of defensive structure which has not survived.
Agios Konstantinos’ main gate is also possibly defended by an extension of the eastern
bastion, which is a small, narrow wall extending down the mountainside for a short distance. The
extremely rocky terrain makes its contours difficult to discern, and its location, while it would be
strange for a terrace wall, is equally strange considering the sharp drop from the bastion to where
it stands. No ground-level imagery depicts this feature, it is ignored in schematic drawings, and it
is absent from written sources. This silence would strongly imply it to be a terrace wall, but the
strong flanking position it would provide makes such a conclusion difficult to draw.
Fig. 16. Agios Konstantinos with least-cost path of assault (the gully) and bow and sling ranges noted. Note the
concavity of the walls around the gate. Map of Church of Agios Konstantinos, Telendos from: "Kalymnos, Greece"
Map, Google Earth.
Galatiani, meanwhile, features multiple wall projections, a high flanking cliff, and a lone
rampart extension, but seemingly no towers. The identified location of its southern gate
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Koutellas gives, right around the center of the southern wall, is a cliff face, which, in
photographs, appears functionally impassable without climbing, let alone for any beast of burden
or wheeled vehicle. Given that Koutellas’ drawings appear to have been done without the aid of
aerial imagery judging by certain distortions, it is possible his placement was merely off, and
likelier that the current entrance to the kastro, on the southwestern corner, is the ancient one. The
assumed southern gate is indented within the wall, with cliff face on the left and likely ramparted
wall to the right, creating a long stretch of vulnerable path without any cover, exploiting the right
flank and rear as attackers near the gate. Moreover, if it was intended to bear a rampart, the small
projection of wall would stand to the left of this assumed gateway, thus granting the defenders a
concave firing position on any attackers at the gate. The north portion of Galatiani’s wall features
a sharp drop to the right and a cliff to the left of the approach, and both a possible tower and a
projecting bastion stand to the right of the gate, while the cliff on the left would provide an
elevated firing position on the attackers left flank for at least the last 150 meters of the path, or
more if the defenders were to move onto less even ground.
Finally, Chora Kastro features a long switchback ascent which exposes both sides to
towers at various points. Notably, the final approach to the gate involves exposing first the right,
and then the rear as well to a number of towers. At the main gate, this would result in
overlapping fire from three directions, making any assault perilous. In fact, the only side which is
not vulnerable on the final approach to the gate is the left side.
Though only featuring a single fortification entirely of its own siting, the Latin period
shows a continuation of the same trend as shown in previous works. The castle of Chrysocheria
is a strange one, with multiple entrances at different angles; however, the approaches to both the
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main gate and the postern expose the right flank to a high rampart, and, in the case of the main
gate, a sizeable tower as well.
In general, all the Roman fortifications are technically capable of providing concave fire
against an attacking force at some point during the route the enemy would have to take to assault
the fortress, with a few caveats. As stated, Kastelli’s defenders would almost always have the
ability to fire on the enemy’s right flank; however, concave fire would only be achieved in any
significant sense once the enemy were inside the outer walls, at which point the left-flank firing
position, the outer rampart and towers, would be quite easily overrun and negated through
accessing the walls by whatever means the defenders used. The smaller emphasis on this tactic in
Kastelli is likely explained by its being a double-layered fortification, meaning that the defense
of its outer gate was not the only option, as defenders had a fortified keep as a fallback, which
none of the other kastra appear to have had. The second caveat regards Chora Kastro, which is
that, when considering its Roman predecessor, it must always be noted that its structure would
likely have varied, though the degree is impossible to ascertain, beyond the obvious addition of
cannon embrasures. The profusion of walls and foundations within Chora Kastro may well
conceal or repurpose or overlie a Roman inner wall which once protected a keep like that of
Kastelli; without an intensive survey to answer this question, it will remain unanswered.
Intervisibility
The pre-Roman fortresses of Kastellas and Kastri lack intervisibility, as does almost
every major center of activity at the time. The island appears to lack a mutually-dependent
fortification system, instead having two small fortress/settlement systems, one consisting of
Kastri above Emborio, and the other of Kastellas above Embolas. The settlement-town system
79
does not seem to apply to Damos, leaving it as somewhat of an oddity with its lack of nearby
fortifications. However, for the first two examples, it seems that intervisibility was only
important between each settlement and its associated fortification, as there are no attempts by
such fortifications to “bridge the gap” between the three regions of the island, and thus each
would have been effectively isolated when threatened.
During the seventh century, under the Romans, the move toward fortified habitation areas
seems to have also promoted a more unified island-wide approach to building defenses. The
abandonment of Embolas in favor of Rina at the mouth of the bay was likely motivated by
economic factors, since the harbor would always have been vitally important, and the hidden
nature of the valley would protect it adequately on its own. Beyond Rina, the three fortifications
of Kastelli, Galatiani, and Agios Konstantinos are all mutually intervisible from at least one point
within the site, and, combined, can see the entire occupied west of Kalymnos north of Vigla hill,
as well as out to much of the northern waters, past Telendos to the south, and basically all the
approaches to their portion of the island (figs. 17, 18, 19). While rough terrain would make
actually moving large numbers of troops or civilians between these locations difficult, the value
of being forewarned could be significant, allowing these settlements to ‘turtle up,’ becoming
sufficiently unattractive targets as to deter raiders. Time would be of the essence, and the
forewarning these positions could provide may have meant the difference between a raid suffered
and a raid averted.
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Figs. 17, 18, & 19. Galatiani (Fig. 17, top left), Kasteli (Fig. 18, top right), and Agios Konstantinos’ (Fig. 19,
bottom) viewsheds showing intervisibility between the three fortifications. Map of Kalymnos, Greece from:
"Kalymnos, Greece" Map, Google Earth.
Chora Kastro’s significant visual separation from the other three kastra is likely explained
by their abandonment in the 10th century, and the rise of Chora Kastro soon after in the late 11th
century (Koutellas, “Ta Kastra,” 437, 441). The numerous ruins of rural churches and
monasteries indicate that settlements were likely still dispersed, but the establishment of Chora
Kastro represents a fundamental shift in the population dynamics of the island, indicating a
population high enough that it would best benefit from protecting itself first and foremost.
Moreover, it speaks to the shift in population distribution as well, considering that there were
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clearly enough people living in the relatively open and (compared to Vathy) less fertile southern
valley to warrant the construction of such a large town, a clear indication that there were few
significant threats during this brief period. The highly defensible position of Chora Kastro is not
necessarily superior to that of the earlier three kastra, and its lack of intervisibility with any
contemporary Roman fortress indicates that the inhabitants probably relied almost entirely on
isolated watch posts. What Chora Kastro has, that the earlier three kastra do not, are an
abundance of living space, accessibility, and economic potential all in one. The entire southern
valley is easily accessible from the Kastro, which is much more agriculturally productive than
the steep surroundings of the other three, allows it to benefit from ports at either end of the
valley, and obviates the need for any further fortification in the valley due to its central location,
making it a remarkably efficient use of labor to build. The near-abandonment of the southern
valley did not repeat as it did during late antiquity, and the population continued to utilize the
valley despite threats which might have urged them to seek more remote locations. Clearly the
Roman builders of Chora Kastro had found an ideal site, since the oft-shifting population of
Kalymnos continued to inhabit the fortified town through the reigns of three empires, and the
only recorded instance of its walls being breached was the result of an earthquake in 1493, and
were quickly repaired (Koutellas, “Ta Kastra,” 441). This is all the more impressive when one
considers that it was the target of many raids, including several that nearly depopulated the
island, and yet the surviving elements of the fortifications show no signs of battle damage despite
those incidents (Heslop 39).
Research Questions
The fortification scheme of Roman Kalymnos went through three distinct phases
throughout time. The first phase seems to have been very peaceful, with Hellenistic fortifications
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being abandoned, and even city walls being left in ruins after their destruction by the A.D. 554
earthquake. The second phase of the fortification scheme breaks sharply from the first,
responding to the threat of Arab raids by concentrating the population (other than Rina) in three
intervisible kastra, using expediently constructed but excellently sited and laid-out fortification
walls to protect the inaccessible settlements. The third and final phase of fortification on
Kalymnos was centered around Chora Kastro in the southern valley, providing a much larger
population center than any that had existed during the previous phase. The centrality of Chora
Kastro would be maintained for centuries, well after Kalymnos left Roman rule.
The construction of the kastra was almost certainly prompted by the seventh-century
Arab raids. The circumstances surrounding their construction, aside from the raids, were the
collapse of the eastern portion of the Empire, the establishment of the theme system, the defeat
of the imperial military on land, and more importantly at sea, and the disruption of the economy
by the Arab conquests. While no evidence confirms or disproves that Kalymnos was directly
raided, the great volume of raids, combined with their significant presence in Roman writings
suggest a high probability that this was the case.
The process of building the kastra would have varied significantly based on a number of
difficult-to-detect factors. However, it can be confidently stated that the seventh-century kastra
were not funded by either the imperial court or some high officer of the Karabisianoi, but likely
were built using resources available on the island and funded locally. Lacking any other obvious
source, and considering the kastra were all settlements, it is likely that the labor for their
construction was provided by their inhabitants, but that their specific layout and siting were
influenced by an individual or group with experience in military matters.
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Strategically, the seventh-century kastra ensured that Kalymnos could remain an open
port for trade and resupply, and that the navies of the Karabisianoi and later Kibyrrhaiotai did not
need to hawkishly patrol the surrounding waters to keep the island relatively safe. Tactically, the
seventh-century kastra all possess excellent fields of fire against any attacking force, regularly
exploit the enemy’s right flank and possess concave firing positions, allow for effective
placement of artillery, create clear sight lines for signaling and detection of threats at great
distances, and generally are sited so as to make any raid tremendously costly.
Kalymnos’ place in the Empire is reflected in the dispersal of its kastra. Each of the
seventh-century fortifications is close to the sea but difficult to access, despite much more
accessible coastline nearby. The dispersed population and seaside proximity is a clear indicator
that the island was a hinterland reliant on trade and exploitation of maritime resources, but not so
successful in either of these things to warrant enough protection to obviate the need for fortified
settlements. Moreover, the rubble walls of its kastra indicate the local nature of the defensive
effort, and thus the relative unimportance of the island in the grand scheme of imperial defense.
The value of GIS is its ability to systematically apply criteria and quantify data rather
than make general assessments. Mapping would have been key without GIS, but with it,
conclusions can be drawn with far greater precision and confidence. Weapon ranges could not be
drawn without the use of GIS, nor could cost-paths or viewsheds be established. The
intervisibility of the sites would have been impossible to determine based on available
photography and textual evidence due to the rarity of visitors to Galatiani, and the use of modern
boats to access both Agios Konstantinos and Kastelli would have left little information about
how the sites would have originally been approached.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
Any examination of the literature on these sites would be incomplete without
acknowledging the unfortunate combination of their being understudied and over-visited. Further
research must be conducted to draw solid conclusions about the kastra, but with tourism comes
the degradation of these sites, year by year. As the archaeological potential of the kastra erodes,
so too does their value to modern populations. Further protections for the kastra of Kalymnos
should be prioritized before valuable information on an elusive period is lost forever.
Beyond the obvious need for in-person observation, future studies of the kastra, either
through excavation or non-invasive methods, would be of tremendous value in clarifying the
nature of the sites. Such studies would allow for a precise chronology to be established, activities
of the inhabitants to be understood, and perhaps even allow interpretations as to the degree of
militarization of the inhabitants.
Much GIS work remains to be done on the kastra of Kalymnos. The use of a proper
military toolset capable of accurately simulating ballistic trajectories would allow more nuanced
understandings of the fields of fire of the kastra, and permit new conclusions to be drawn about
how they would have been defended and attacked. Moreover, with greater research into sources
of water on the island, significant conclusions might be drawn about the positioning of kastra
relative to locations of ancient wells, with significant implications on the options available to
contemporary raiders. In general, deeper investigation into the raiders’ side of the conflict would
be of great value. Nonetheless, this study provides a strong baseline in spatial analysis of the
island, upon which future research can build.
The following can be determined with a reasonable degree of confidence about the kastra
of Agios Konstantinos, Galatiani, and Kastelli:
85
The three kastra were built in the seventh century in response to the growing threat of
Arab naval attack, likely while Kalymnos was under the control of the Karabisianoi. These sites
were permanent settlements of considerable size for the island, were built by local laborers with
local materials, and likely had some form of military expertise involved involved in their
planning. The kastra were likely built to meet local needs, rather than fulfill a request from on
high. Their designs all stress concave firing positions, terrain exploitation, and intervisibility.
Agios Konstantinos’ fortifications were likely built of local natural rubble, with possibly
a small amount of Hellenistic spolia in its western wall. Though the evidence for the kastra as
settlements is rather clear, Agios Konstantinos is certainly one, based on its sheer size and
number of houses. The number of house remains, large cisterns, and substantial church suggest a
significant resident population. From the military standpoint, Agios Konstantinos features the
most complete concave field of fire of any of the kastra at its northern gate, where attackers
would be funneled up a narrow streambed, with defenders in elevated positions to their sides and
front, and eventually even to the rear. The wall stands above one of only two reasonable landing
spots on the north side of Telendos, and grants defenders the ability to fire down to the beach, or
even further with artillery. Even more than the other two, Agios Konstantinos is remarkably
efficient in terms of the strength of its defenses relative to the labor they would have required to
build.
Kastelli was the most heavily fortified of the three kastra, the only one with two layers of
walls, and the only one to still preserve crenellations. Its thick walls cut off the peninsula on
which it stands, which is surrounded by steep rocky slopes, and protected at the rear by a lower
wall circuit. Its well-preserved cisterns are remarkably large for a site so small in total area,
suggesting a great ability to withstand siege. While not quite as expansive as those provided by
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Galatiani, Kastelli acts as the centerpoint of the intervisibility network of the three kastra, and
allows views of the entire Telendos straits. It possesses numerous firing positions and the only
indisputable remains of towers. Combined with its position close to the coastal cliff face, this
would allow artillerists within Kastelli to shut off all passage along the land corridor of the west
coast, as well as threaten vessels at sea out to a considerable distance. While this kastro has finer
stonework than the other two, no existing explanation for this is logically consistent, and it may
merely be a result of the less naturally defensible terrain of the site, compared to the other two.
Kastelli’s fortifications would have likely been the most labor intensive to build by far, and their
organization suggests an effort to make the most defensible site possible given the terrain,
meaning that the site itself was likely too good to pass up for any number of reasons.
Galatiani contrasts with the other two kastra due to its location and its preservation. The
highest in elevation, Galatiani is further inland and higher in elevation than its contemporaries,
and significantly less preserved, despite being so out-of-the-way. The location of Galatiani would
certainly have complicated trade and travel, but the security of its natural setting was significant,
and the views it offered were unparalleled, allowing it to clearly see past Telendos and out all the
way to Asia Minor’s shores. Thus, military reasons were likely even more significant as a factor
in the selection of Galatiani’s location than for the other kastra, where such reasoning was
already clearly at the top of the list. This concern with defense is shown also in its extensive
fortification, taking the form of a mere single layer of walls, but a single layer that wraps all the
way around the nearly-sheer western slope, as if to make extra sure that none would even attempt
the climb. By contrast to Agios Konstantinos, which, in many places, allows cliffs to serve as its
barriers, Galatiani’s design seems excessive. It likewise features flank exploitation at its north
and south gates, with both featuring projections that would allow for fire from both flanks.
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Indeed, like Agios Konstantinos’ east promontory, Galatiani’s north promontory would allow
defenders to pour fire into enemies for hundreds of meters before they could even make the final
approach to the gate. Galatiani’s cisterns are huge, but the number of houses recorded in
schematics is relatively small, especially considering its massive internal area. It is unclear if
more houses are simply unidentified or buried, but, if not, Galatiani would have a dramatically
lower population density than the other two kastra.
Unfortunately, all of the previous conclusions become very hazy when applied to Chora
Kastro, separated as it is by time and topography, and, more importantly, its lack of remaining
identifiably Roman components. The only firm conclusion that can be drawn is that, when
considering its foundation on the heels of the abandonment of the seventh-century kastra, the
establishment of Chora Kastro indicates another dramatic population shift, on the scale of that
which preceded the original three.
Kalymnos was, by all indications, beneath imperial attention, and secondary at best in the
Empire’s military plans for the eastern Aegean. The island is absent from major texts, lacks
inscriptions from the period, and its contemporary houses were largely built of rubble. Yet, in the
face of economic collapse and enemy attack, the people of Kalymnos, a mere handful of
generations after an earthquake that sank their best port beneath the sea, fortified themselves in
three highly secure kastra or took refuge in the valley of Vathy. These activities indicate a level
of energy and innovation not often associated with peripheral areas, and the expertise evident in
the careful selection of sites and planning of defenses suggests a familiarity with defensive
tactics as and the conventions of fortifications in the empire. Wherever this knowledge came
from, the pragmatic application of these principles to their specific geographic location allowed
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the island to remain a functioning portion of the Empire throughout the entire period of Arab
raids.
Though the east fell rapidly to the Arabs, the Empire had clearly done right by the
Kalymnians in some way, as demonstrated by the remains of the kastra they built that are still
visible today. Through multiple lines of research, including analysis of textual sources, personal
observation, archaeological data, and GIS analysis, the function and nature of these fortifications
can be elucidated. As these sites continue to decay, archaeological intervention would be vital in
preserving this important record of a people caught between the rubble of antiquity and the fires
of the middle ages.
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